Malicious RTF / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 c1a3563931fa2243…

MALICIOUS

RTF / .DOC

3.7 KB
MD5: 66dd7813d08a65abe076c78f3b2e2699 SHA-1: cd2a9026496865e395723ccb68a39fabeed06f2c SHA-256: c1a3563931fa2243d1ebb352779d3d94869ee26a38c87c257c2a02022845986a
120 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

The RTF document contains embedded OLE objects, specifically triggering heuristics related to the Equation Editor vulnerability. The presence of `RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR` and `RTF_OBJUPDATE` strongly suggests exploitation of a known Equation Editor flaw to achieve arbitrary code execution upon opening. No further stages or specific family indicators were identified.

Heuristics 3

  • Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 2 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off000000cf.bin
b2a2d2c93e54fed596440eca7f3bfe29861910d0a6cf7d010be9aba98465598f
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0xCF 1582 bytes