Malicious Office (OLE) / .XLSX — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 c19c24e3c18eea9f…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE) / .XLSX

194.0 KB
MD5: 1cfd17f05ef34074d53e52f1ac3e0235 SHA-1: a6739b4665f3a280dae89fc9a8dd29b87a12551c SHA-256: c19c24e3c18eea9ff5c5636ef4e6bd8d15c8c30c5ae42a6109762c74c401cea3
142 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1204.002 Malicious File T1059.001 PowerShell

The critical heuristic firing for CVE-2017-0199 indicates that this OOXML document is designed to exploit a vulnerability in OLE linking to load a remote resource. The embedded URL, http://honeysposecurityfileexchangeservice.duckdns.org/all/invoice.doc, is the likely source of the secondary payload. The document is password-encrypted, a common tactic to obfuscate malicious content.

Heuristics 5

  • OLE2Link / URL Moniker → remote loader — CVE-2017-0199 critical CVE likely CVE_2017_0199
    Document contains an embedded OLE link object whose URL Moniker points to a remote URL. When the host file is opened, Office follows the link, downloads the URL, and processes the response based on its Content-Type (HTA -> mshta.exe, RTF → Word, etc.) — the documented CVE-2017-0199 primitive. The URL extension is not a reliable filter; servers can return different payloads to Office's user agent.
  • Default-encrypted OOXML exploit carrier layout high OOXML_ENCRYPTED_EXPLOIT_CARRIER_SHAPE
    Default-password encrypted OOXML package contains embedded OLE object parts and additional activation/decoy parts. This layout is common in malicious Excel exploit delivery and requires inspecting the decrypted package.
  • Office document is password-encrypted medium OFFICE_ENCRYPTED_PACKAGE
    OLE container holds MS-OFFCRYPTO encrypted package (Standard Encryption (Office 2007+, AES-128)).
  • Office OOXML encrypted with default VelvetSweatshop password medium OFFICE_DEFAULT_PASSWORD_ENCRYPTED_OOXML
    OLE EncryptedPackage decrypts with Excel's built-in VelvetSweatshop password. Office opens this transparently, and malware uses it to hide OOXML exploit parts from scanners that only inspect the outer OLE container.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://honeysposecurityfileexchangeservice.duckdns.org/all/invoice.doc

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