Malicious RTF / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 c18a8f9b247d1af8…

MALICIOUS

RTF / .DOC

720.4 KB Created: 2019-09-17 13:59:00
MD5: 1cc97f80c8e2b8c63dcced418802f05d SHA-1: ea7a55042caf762d2ef656a4395b6abe09f57644 SHA-256: c18a8f9b247d1af804f7deb0e94fd9e853f760e27bdab7b39aceb17b12e90954
200 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1204.002 Malicious File Execution: Malicious File T1566.001 Phishing: Spearphishing Attachment

The sample is an RTF document containing an embedded OLE object, specifically targeting the Equation Editor vulnerability (CVE-2017-8759). This indicates an attempt to exploit the Equation Editor to execute arbitrary code upon opening the document. The presence of RTF_OBJDATA, RTF_OBJEMB, RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR, RTF_OBJUPDATE, and CVE_2017_8759 heuristics strongly supports this attack pattern. No scripts were extracted, and the document body was heavily obfuscated, but the core exploit mechanism is clear.

Heuristics 6

  • CVE-2017-8759 — MSXML SAX OLE activation critical CVE likely CVE_2017_8759
    RTF contains a hex-encoded OLE1 object for Msxml2.SAXXMLReader.6.0 followed by an embedded OLE compound document, and the document requests OLE activation. This matches the RTF staging shape used for CVE-2017-8759 SOAP/WSDL parser code injection.
  • Equation Editor CLSID critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    Equation Editor OLE CLSID found inside an OLE object — exploited by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 / CVE-2018-0798
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 1 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
  • Embedded OLE object medium RTF_OBJEMB
    RTF contains \objemb — embedded OLE object
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2003/wordml

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off000acc53.bin
e96faae66610b73dd57baee0f268a9191ec44c347dda2203b34755bdfd2bb644		 rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0xACC53 3739 bytes

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