Formbook — Office (OLE) / .XLSX malware analysis

Static analysis result for SHA-256 c16c83cd39bc8a46…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE) / .XLSX

224.2 KB First seen: 2022-05-16
MD5: 8a97006054586f482524fd745cb2dd48 SHA-1: 9a37526d9f56a28ce091959d90c4c23e2af64787 SHA-256: c16c83cd39bc8a464a2f5842cf51f04649fb6b587a6b59b703cee061a70d4571
280 Risk Score

Malware Insights

Formbook · confidence 95%

MITRE ATT&CK
T1204 Malicious File T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

The sample is a password-encrypted Office XLSX file containing an embedded Equation Editor OLE object. Heuristics indicate exploitation of CVE-2018-0798 via this object, a known technique for delivering malware. ClamAV detection confirms this as a Formbook downloader. The encryption and malformed structure suggest an attempt to evade static analysis, but the embedded exploit carrier and Equation Editor OLE object are strong indicators of malicious intent.

Heuristics 7

  • Equation Editor OLE object high CVE related OLE_EQUATION_EDITOR
    Default-encrypted OOXML embedded OLE object xl/embeddings/oleObject1.bin contains the Equation Editor CLSID, the legacy component exploited by CVE-2017-11882, CVE-2018-0802, and CVE-2018-0798.
  • CVE-2018-0798 — anomalous Equation Editor native stream high CVE likely CVE_2018_0798_EQUATION_NATIVE_ANOMALY
    Default-encrypted OOXML contains embedded Equation Editor data with anomalous native stream bytes consistent with a CVE-2018-0798-style exploit. This is treated as likely CVE evidence because the Equation object is malformed and payload-like.
  • Encrypted Office package with CFB FAT corruption critical OLE_ENCRYPTED_AND_MALFORMED
    Encrypted-package shape co-occurs with FAT-chain corruption — the documented combined evasion form.
  • ClamAV: Doc.Downloader.Formbook-bc97c1e0c33c3c93-9951465-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Doc.Downloader.Formbook-bc97c1e0c33c3c93-9951465-0
  • Default-encrypted OOXML exploit carrier layout high OOXML_ENCRYPTED_EXPLOIT_CARRIER_SHAPE
    Default-password encrypted OOXML package contains embedded OLE object parts and additional activation/decoy parts. This layout is common in malicious Excel exploit delivery and requires inspecting the decrypted package.
  • Office document is password-encrypted medium OFFICE_ENCRYPTED_PACKAGE
    OLE container holds MS-OFFCRYPTO encrypted package (Standard Encryption (Office 2007, AES)).
  • Office OOXML encrypted with default VelvetSweatshop password medium OFFICE_DEFAULT_PASSWORD_ENCRYPTED_OOXML
    OLE EncryptedPackage decrypts with Excel's built-in VelvetSweatshop password. Office opens this transparently, and malware uses it to hide OOXML exploit parts from scanners that only inspect the outer OLE container.