Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 c1677b21f004c682…

MALICIOUS

PDF

67.1 KB Created: 2020-11-29 17:44:53 +02:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7)
MD5: 6c2061bc8285c28e20bd2f274b17d405 SHA-1: d287fd3ed674cf9e4396c3130ef2573ea6a9091c SHA-256: c1677b21f004c682a180c2dcc4e723dd4c4a282acbb5f9ba279c4083cfb86433
252 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1059.007 JavaScript

This PDF file contains numerous embedded links, many of which point to redirector infrastructure and disposable hosting, indicating a link farm designed for malicious purposes. The ML classifier and ClamAV detection strongly suggest malicious intent. The primary malicious link identified is https://cctraff.ru/strik?utm_term=production+and+operations+analysis+6th+edition+pdf+free, which likely serves as a gateway to a phishing or malware distribution site.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9998

Heuristics 7

  • PDF links to known malicious redirector infrastructure critical PDF_MALICIOUS_REDIRECTOR_LINK
    PDF contains a clickable URI to redirector infrastructure used by a known malicious PDF SEO/adware delivery campaign. These documents typically rely on user interaction and redirect chains rather than a PDF parser vulnerability.
  • Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
  • ClamAV: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2528dad23a95d95-d2528dad23a95d95-10044376-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2528dad23a95d95-d2528dad23a95d95-10044376-0
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Urgency / deadline lure low SE_URGENCY_LURE
    Document contains urgency or deadline language ('account will be terminated', 'action required within 24 hours', etc.) — useful context, but low-signal without other findings
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://cctraff.ru/strik?utm_term=production+and+operations+analysis+6th+edition+pdf+free
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4472486/normal_5fad6a5a17ed9.pdf
    • https://nozuresosobud.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/7/134758814/3259156.pdf
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4372376/normal_5f90b9a2688e5.pdf
    • https://zikenanevo.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/5/134589255/mawukoxeza_vawokadida.pdf
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4480588/normal_5fbec1e0ad089.pdf
    • https://satupagewamikim.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/5/134584558/0f28b4dd2.pdf
    • https://zuxubemusaf.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/4/131453996/8df083c64.pdf
    • https://paviliwele.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/4/134489687/komosufateki_sazanuk.pdf
    • https://katolafafesol.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/4/134479470/pivugawe-pizope-wagen.pdf
    • https://vunolevakedo.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/3/134317922/2e7f52.pdf
    • https://topagolidokade.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/5/134502990/3925771.pdf
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.html
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/e87c6f7b-f8fc-4eda-8fca-ff9cdab4362f/zazurolajaludakerufanex.pdf
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFL

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off0000c946.bin
621f8e74f57353cf954a2007fd9a8a87c7673d4d4e0a765e5215af0156cc54f4		 pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xC946 5500 bytes
font_01_sfnt_off0000dc01.bin
f86bb98a65ca97894c267c3fd9d4c5ad845e84880d079e42baab927d3dff8c49		 pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xDC01 10280 bytes

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