MALICIOUS
340
Risk Score
Malware Insights
MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.001 PowerShell
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment
T1204.002 Malicious File
The sample utilizes OOXML_ALTCHUNK_RTF and RTF_MZ_HEX heuristics to indicate the import of an RTF object containing a PE executable. The RTF_OBJUPDATE and RTF_COMPOSITE_MONIKER_RELATED firings suggest that the embedded object is designed to be activated automatically. This points to a delivery mechanism that leverages Office vulnerabilities to execute a payload, likely for further system compromise.
Heuristics 9
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Composite Moniker in RTF OLE object high RTF_COMPOSITE_MONIKER_RELATED(in altChunk RTF word/Bolivia.rtf) RTF contains Composite Moniker CLSID in OLE object context, but no nearby scriptlet/SCT payload was confirmed. Treat as related moniker attack-surface evidence rather than proof of CVE-2017-8570 exploitation.
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altChunk imports embedded RTF (RTF injection) critical OOXML_ALTCHUNK_RTFDocument inlines an embedded RTF via an aFChunk relationship and a <w:altChunk> body element. This is the canonical RTF-injection wrapper used to smuggle RTF exploits (Equation Editor / URL Moniker / objdata) past DOCX-only scanners. Word opens the wrapper and executes the RTF inline. Recursing into the RTF for the exact exploit primitive.
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PE header (with DOS stub) in hex data critical RTF_MZ_HEX(in altChunk RTF word/Bolivia.rtf) Hex-encoded PE (MZ + DOS stub) found inside RTF — likely an embedded executable payload
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altChunk RTF auto-updates embedded executable object critical OOXML_ALTCHUNK_RTF_AUTOUPDATE_PEOOXML document imports an embedded RTF through altChunk; the RTF contains OLE object data, forces object update, and carries a hex-encoded PE payload. This is a stronger compound exploit-loader shape than a generic altChunk RTF wrapper, but it is not tied to a single CVE unless the nested RTF object primitive also matches one.
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\objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE(in altChunk RTF word/Bolivia.rtf) RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
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Large hex data blocks in OLE object high RTF_EXCESSIVE_HEX(in altChunk RTF word/Bolivia.rtf) RTF contains ~1344KB of hex-encoded data inside \objdata sections — may hide a payload
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OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA(in altChunk RTF word/Bolivia.rtf) RTF contains 2 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
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Embedded OLE object medium RTF_OBJEMB(in altChunk RTF word/Bolivia.rtf) RTF contains \objemb — embedded OLE object
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Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URLOne or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.URL http://opendope.org/xpaths
- http://opendope.org/conditions
- http://opendope.org/questions
- http://opendope.org/components
- http://opendope.org/SmartArt/DataHierarchy
- http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/wordprocessingml/2006/main
- http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/math
- http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/relationships
- http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/wordprocessingDrawing
- http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/main
- http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/schemaLibrary/2006/main
- http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/chart
- http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/chartDrawing
- http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/diagram
- http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/picture
- http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/spreadsheetDrawing
- http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2008/diagram
- http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/bibliography
- http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/compatibility
- http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/lockedCanvas
Extracted artifacts 2
Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.
| Filename | Kind | Source | Size |
|---|---|---|---|
objdata_00_off00003a12.binb4f0e136ad48d7bad0e015304f54559c653f4b95af3565580538a634e55a471b |
rtf-objdata-decoded | RTF \objdata at offset 0x3A12 | 685290 bytes |
objdata_01_off0015dc18.bin31e3bdb4635082b6f5401bd7688a1baf90019932fe37de5dee9246f0964b7ef4 |
rtf-objdata-decoded | RTF \objdata at offset 0x15DC18 | 584266 bytes |
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