PDF malware analysis — malicious · c0bb1007e73b5932

MALICIOUS

PDF

12.2 KB

MD5: 343c7a2faf6bf48317d50d75f183b1d0 SHA-1: 71a1080fca13bfe871cba3f36746cc45f998f5d6 SHA-256: c0bb1007e73b59323963cc1e0ddedbdf6c2a61dfb2d33d8b3c64a91912dd309f

186 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK

T1059.001 PowerShell T1204.002 Malicious File

The PDF file contains embedded JavaScript that is obfuscated and staged using a hex decoder, as indicated by the 'PDF_ANNOT_SUBJECT_CALLEE_HEX_STAGER' and 'CVE_2007_5659' heuristics. The primary exploit appears to be CVE-2007-5659, related to the `Collab.collectEmailInfo` function. The ClamAV detection of 'Pdf.Exploit.Agent-36063' further confirms its malicious nature. The embedded JavaScript is designed to be executed, likely to download and run a secondary payload.

Heuristics 7

Collab.collectEmailInfo — CVE-2007-5659 critical CVE exact CVE_2007_5659

PDF JavaScript calls Collab.collectEmailInfo — CVE-2007-5659 is a buffer overflow in Adobe Reader triggered by a long argument or heap-sprayed message field passed to Collab.collectEmailInfo(). Part of a series of Acrobat JS API exploits. (identified after JavaScript deobfuscation)
ClamAV: Pdf.Exploit.Agent-36063 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION

ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Exploit.Agent-36063
Annotation subject callee-key hex JavaScript stager high PDF_ANNOT_SUBJECT_CALLEE_HEX_STAGER

PDF JavaScript uses syncAnnotScan()/getAnnots() to read an indirect annotation /Subject stream, percent-decodes it through marker replacement, then uses a callee.toString()-derived key to decode and eval the final exploit stage.
JavaScript action low PDF_JAVASCRIPT

PDF contains a /JavaScript action. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
Embedded JS stream low PDF_JS

PDF references a /JS stream. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
syncAnnotScan annotation-staging primitive low PDF_FOXIT_SYNCANNOTSCAN

PDF JavaScript calls syncAnnotScan() — a no-op annotation-enumeration primitive used by exploit-kit JavaScript to stage payload reads from annotation /Subject fields before eval(). Not a vulnerable sink itself; rarely seen in legitimate PDFs. (matched in decompressed stream)
Suspicious extracted artifact info EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE

One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

Filename	Kind	Source	Size
`javascript_obj0007_000.js` `eb39e2de4dbbc100de6d3e30aa43ff78fa075618862ba1ebba5151ea3a3b848d`	pdf-javascript-stream	PDF /JS object 7 at offset 0x19D	273 bytes
`annotation_subject_callee_hex_stage_000.js` `22c3c5421a443708818e1888b5445d4f91fba67a541bf3e8b97937f73c25aeed`	deobfuscated-js	annotation-subject callee-key decoded JavaScript at offset 0x14A	5246 bytes
Detection ClamAV: No threats found Obfuscation or payload: likely Carved artifact contains 5 eval/decoder/string-building token(s).
`deobfuscated.js` `b04bc77960a710195c2d6b20c0527194a2710fc8700d16143b2e0d181ea487f1`	deobfuscated-js	PDF JavaScript deobfuscation pass	71803 bytes
Detection ClamAV: No threats found Obfuscation or payload: likely Carved artifact contains 1 long base64-like blob(s).

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