Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 c0ad6b0cb0f295c9…

MALICIOUS

PDF

83.0 KB Created: 2021-05-22 11:22:42 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7) First seen: 2021-09-25
MD5: fbb0112fcc81148c9233deeaa3a7bf77 SHA-1: 532326296a0682843d3135ab7ceac46943eb30ab SHA-256: c0ad6b0cb0f295c9213ce4a25dd2330be65ef2cdd6f63be4ee8de8ca912398f1
316 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1204.002 User Execution: Malicious Link T1059.007 JavaScript

This PDF document exhibits multiple high-risk heuristics indicative of a phishing and malware delivery attempt. It contains a large number of external links, some of which are associated with SEO link farms, and instructs the user to disable security software and execute commands via the clipboard, a common 'ClickFix' social engineering tactic. The primary malicious URL identified is https://fokemale.ru/strik?utm_term=activate+windows+10+pro+using+cmd+2020, which likely serves as a lure to download a second-stage payload.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9996

Heuristics 9

  • ClamAV: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0
  • Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
  • Clipboard command execution lure high SE_CLIPBOARD_COMMAND_LURE
    Document tells the user to copy or paste clipboard content into Run, PowerShell, cmd, or another shell-like execution context
  • LOLBin token sequence in document text high SE_LOLBIN_RUN_COMMAND
    Extracted document text contains a Windows script/execution tool name (PowerShell, mshta, cmd, rundll32, regsvr32, …) within 220 characters of a dangerous flag, command verb, or URL. This is a visible 'run this' instruction in HTML/PDF/RTF lure bodies, or — in macro-laden Office files — the macro's own string-pool entries appearing adjacent in extracted text.
  • ClickFix social engineering attack high SE_CLICKFIX
    Document instructs the user to press Win+R or paste a command into a terminal — consistent with ClickFix attacks that bypass macro restrictions by tricking users into running malicious commands directly
  • Security software disable instruction high SE_SECURITY_BYPASS
    Document instructs the user to disable antivirus or security software — unusual for ordinary documents and high-risk in an unsolicited file
  • External URI info PDF_URI
    PDF contains an external URL action
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://fokemale.ru/strik?utm_term=activate+windows+10+pro+using+cmd+2020 PDF link annotation
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4466673/normal_60445bbeb44da.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://mabaxezo.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/7/134766945/wigobusita.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://judexibegajojid.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/8/134885636/2963775.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4483338/normal_600ea39ad6385.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://static.s123-cdn-static.com/uploads/4392462/normal_5fffed8f60c67.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://damesijegimu.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/6/134624484/kosorupamupek.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://fikuvigobe.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/5/134582673/4215906.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://munadixozobud.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/6/134635459/283dbc3ea238.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://magijomolalol.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/4/131437319/8513418.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://teregurejojexol.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/8/134879353/riwekobifo.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://paxowudozu.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/6/0/136095727/wixogejurofamubujen.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://bopevifobomamak.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/0/8/130814579/fuvetigovajila.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://xilowodasu.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/7/134742848/34065bfc9d5.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4380090/normal_603385863e822.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4466673/normalIn macro / runtime command snippet
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/In PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.htmlIn PDF document text
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/dubiditiginowo/rolarebinuwimo.pdfIn macro / runtime command snippet
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/makumapikeze/sanobesilirepamax.pdfIn macro / runtime command snippet
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/geradi/how_to_talk_to_someone_at_dish_network.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/wovedukevikov/convert_html_to._net_core.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/rogugagatuf/sakufakixaxomibe.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/xuzed/lotro_loremaster_trait_tree_guide.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/womirofop/bike_race_pro_mod_apk_android_1.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/jiwisigetizoxif/pobawedafizexigip.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFLIn PDF document text

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off000100b3.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x100B3 5828 bytes
SHA-256: c5400a3c840e64a889be95db163cbdce8cb90d1e81474a6b28215b6b80078dbb
font_01_sfnt_off00011493.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x11493 12280 bytes
SHA-256: a3c3b72a144cc42d1716fe6600f14c02bc884bc1c68753fd41993bbb83c6055e