PDF malware analysis — malicious · c09c3e9b4ee3a326

MALICIOUS

PDF

13.0 KB

MD5: e9303f72e91fad298d4e3cfabbef34d6 SHA-1: b22080c963a19339988a834ab05f2a2bf1a803f4 SHA-256: c09c3e9b4ee3a326529863ea0a2a495d3433c0c1f97babe2e7f2c97ead78dd94

116 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK

T1204 Malicious File T1204.002 Malicious File: User Execution: Malicious Attachment T1566 Phishing T1566.001 Phishing: Spearphishing Attachment

The critical ClamAV detection and ML classifier firing strongly indicate malicious intent. The PDF contains embedded files and an XFA form, common vectors for exploiting PDF vulnerabilities. The embedded URL, while not directly malicious in reputation, is part of the document's structure that facilitates the exploit. The primary attack pattern involves exploiting a PDF vulnerability to achieve code execution, likely for downloading further malware.

Machine Learning

Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 1.0000

Heuristics 5

ClamAV: Pdf.Exploit.Agent-36962 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION

ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Exploit.Agent-36962
Embedded file low PDF_EMBEDDED

PDF embeds a file attachment — could carry an executable or another weaponised document as a nested payload
XFA form low PDF_XFA

PDF uses XML Forms Architecture — can contain script logic
AcroForm button with action trigger low PDF_ACROFORM_BUTTON

PDF contains a /Btn form field together with a SubmitForm/URI/Launch/JS trigger — this is the building block of fake 'Download' or 'Open' button overlays used in PDF phishing lures
Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL

One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.

URL http://www.xfa.org/schema/xfa-locale-set/2.1/

Extracted artifacts 5

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

Filename	Kind	Source	Size
`embedded_file_obj0041.bin` `c06dcd026a7ea0536b63e07ce688691b585339a3ab7ff59065e546b56308c7bb`	pdf-embedded-file	PDF EmbeddedFile object 41 at offset 0x26C8	85 bytes
`embedded_file_obj0042.bin` `dda0835df994b8be920f715db36452f6cee7bb42bbc9c897f878a7b298ba8e91`	pdf-embedded-file	PDF EmbeddedFile object 42 at offset 0x277A	1029 bytes
`embedded_file_obj0043.bin` `9c58a0994eee827abd1bc8adae7b02a4c6236f9577fb5360a2838db447a23842`	pdf-embedded-file	PDF EmbeddedFile object 43 at offset 0x2993	1789 bytes
`embedded_file_obj0044.bin` `3dd68f00f4fcb366a2a3a17c65cb2626eeddf5ea5713302d374310561d810169`	pdf-embedded-file	PDF EmbeddedFile object 44 at offset 0x2DA3	144 bytes
`embedded_file_obj0045.bin` `10c03f88a5f0a0833dc5b2c8ac295b3a3c6f65e23889eb8cc1dc6fe29bf7f275`	pdf-embedded-file	PDF EmbeddedFile object 45 at offset 0x2E4F	77 bytes

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