RTF malware analysis — malicious · c0587da12abc35d4

MALICIOUS

RTF

72.6 KB First seen: 2024-07-30

MD5: 625a04a93d1ab1ffac8c456c25d98b93 SHA-1: f52a29f1a540c218a8587d4fc81ff209288a7f3c SHA-256: c0587da12abc35d421d5cfb374785b021b0c6c07868d12202ea2074b3cf39def

160 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK

T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution T1204.002 Malicious File

The sample is an RTF document that contains an embedded OLE object, specifically targeting the Equation Editor vulnerability. The presence of `RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR`, `RTF_OBJAUTLINK`, and `RTF_OBJUPDATE` heuristics strongly indicates exploitation of this component. This technique is commonly used to achieve arbitrary code execution, typically to download and run a second-stage payload.

Heuristics 4

Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR

RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
Automatically linked OLE object high RTF_OBJAUTLINK

RTF contains \objautlink — an automatically linked OLE object surface that can be updated or activated when Word opens the document.
\objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE

RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA

RTF contains 1 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

Filename	Kind	Source	Size
`objdata_00_off00001a97.bin` `1e2937b114ba3a464f729f8d2ca8ea240674b8bb5dc3608924c2ecc233c7ecb1`	rtf-objdata-decoded	RTF \objdata at offset 0x1A97	1466 bytes

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