Malicious RTF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 c04e20de826fc7df…

MALICIOUS

RTF

45.2 KB
MD5: 46abdc8192490c555b1819bae0d9acd7 SHA-1: 0395b6aa23d334f3d0400f2b6657e87a2e8cff6e SHA-256: c04e20de826fc7df2cea186ea1ce4df135c6c03eda30e261f4fa91aea70fbb35
180 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

The RTF document contains embedded OLE object data, specifically identified as related to the Equation Editor vulnerability (CVE-2017-11882). The presence of \objupdate indicates that the embedded object is forced to activate, leading to the exploitation of this client-side vulnerability. This is a common method for delivering malicious payloads via email attachments.

Heuristics 5

  • Equation Editor activation — CVE-2017-11882 related high CVE related CVE_2017_11882_ACTIVATION_RELATED
    RTF decodes to an Equation.3 ProgID and requests OLE activation with \objemb plus \objupdate. This reaches the legacy Equation Editor attack surface used by CVE-2017-11882/CVE-2018-0802 documents, but the malformed MTEF/native payload needed for stronger attribution was not recovered.
  • Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 2 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
  • Embedded OLE object medium RTF_OBJEMB
    RTF contains \objemb — embedded OLE object

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off00001ef9.bin
834bc768eeef9c6f2c9d0b1fab8f5fd6af7c8c7c44be1279d5a3156bc856a4d2
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x1EF9 1833 bytes