Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 c01da4b6f83b8de0…

MALICIOUS

PDF

49.3 KB Created: 2020-08-05 23:51:37 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7)
MD5: fe7e43282c70e4a88af47c82d4cf29d8 SHA-1: 622a0752d8233c6dafee7e9349f0f2e978512b24 SHA-256: c01da4b6f83b8de05fc26ff043cbb076ce530ea884daa39d78c5fb903ed85ab8
120 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.002 Spearphishing Attachment T1059.001 PowerShell

The PDF file contains a large number of embedded links, many of which point to external resources. One critical heuristic identified a link to a known malicious redirector, and another indicated a mass external PDF link farm. The document body, though heavily obfuscated, contains a URL that appears to be part of this link farm. The primary attack pattern involves luring users to malicious sites through these embedded links.

Heuristics 3

  • PDF links to known malicious redirector infrastructure critical PDF_MALICIOUS_REDIRECTOR_LINK
    PDF contains a clickable URI to redirector infrastructure used by a known malicious PDF SEO/adware delivery campaign. These documents typically rely on user interaction and redirect chains rather than a PDF parser vulnerability.
  • Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://ttraff.ru/pify?keyword=jodi+picoult+19+minutes+pdf
    • http://files.nycmetrostars.com/uploads/1/3/0/7/130776073/4bd8c.pdf
    • http://files.foxchapeldistrictforum.com/uploads/1/3/1/3/131379397/reteluzufovemadogog.pdf
    • http://files.michaelwojciechowski.net/uploads/1/3/1/4/131452958/nusogegone.pdf
    • http://files.danielbooneswcd.com/uploads/1/3/0/8/130814644/keper_bowuwa.pdf
    • http://files.aromacatering.net/uploads/1/3/1/3/131398195/7141974.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0433/4842/6902/files/gosukodumeniredizifit.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0427/7708/4070/files/davem.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0437/0500/8293/files/fasemeziroso.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0437/5855/1189/files/94968382714.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0428/9835/8432/files/sakemiribukewud.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0430/7078/3645/files/xenejidazululelito.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0433/6936/5654/files/webax.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0436/9163/8934/files/6268302418.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0431/6656/4520/files/lajokikiruwomomezim.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0431/3884/2779/files/54399190205.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0427/9762/9596/files/18828193146.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0431/3874/4476/files/34024676262.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0432/1217/7572/files/windows_10_error_code_0xc00000e.pdf
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off00008409.bin
cfa115e2e3db845c79fddbe39e71172ba8980c69ccba70d145f0c0a1e5f92af0		 pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x8409 5192 bytes
font_01_sfnt_off000095ad.bin
2c710ce8726e83f37a7e21194b2a1ea15b80935888fc68a10aebd47851416b22		 pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x95AD 9996 bytes

Open this report in the interactive analyzer, or submit your own file for analysis.