Malicious RTF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 c01942eeca190f76…

MALICIOUS

RTF

23.8 KB
MD5: 9aaf287388698afd5ef8bfeb1fb8ee24 SHA-1: 97c0f28698ddc4e9b512a37f0230de3846922649 SHA-256: c01942eeca190f7672db0e7e3322a21b52c66f669b41f1dd0ef852c8dd003cb3
100 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1204.002 Malicious File T1027 Obfuscated Files or Information

The RTF file contains two OLE object data sections and uses \objupdate to force OLE activation. The Ole10Native stream within the OLE object is also present, indicating the embedding of a potentially malicious object. The document body is heavily obfuscated and does not provide clear textual clues about the intent, but the heuristics strongly suggest an exploit targeting RTF parsing and OLE object handling to execute embedded content.

Heuristics 3

  • Ole10Native stream in RTF OLE object high CVE related RTF_OLE10NATIVE_STREAM
    RTF contains an embedded OLE object with an Ole10Native stream. This is a strong payload-container signal and is related to Word/OLE exploit delivery, but it is not specific enough on its own to assign a CVE.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 2 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off00001321.bin
2f72f4680b32e5ede7adece06c995f49358ff21e7176b66b7be651e46502d9e2
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x1321 4209 bytes