Malicious Office (OLE) / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 c017ce3e89936e3d…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE) / .DOC

103.0 KB Created: 2006-01-25 08:30:00 Authoring application: Microsoft Office Word
MD5: 5eaa942a371727cda6df2fe0f12ba148 SHA-1: 0c2485c74bd138a23aa04930335d8f68d7d7b94c SHA-256: c017ce3e89936e3dc92805a95568b1a74dcaa7221ab32ce58968104446f49ecb
360 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.001 PowerShell T1059.003 Windows Command Shell T1204.002 Malicious File T1105 Ingress Tool Transfer T1055.012 Process Hollowing

The sample exhibits numerous high-severity heuristic firings related to process injection and execution, including references to WinExec, CreateProcess, VirtualAlloc, VirtualProtect, WriteProcessMemory, CreateRemoteThread, LoadLibrary, and GetProcAddress. The OLE slack anomaly also suggests potential obfuscation or embedded malicious content. While no document body or script content was available for direct analysis, the combination of these API calls strongly indicates an attempt to download and execute a second-stage payload, likely through process injection techniques.

Heuristics 9

  • Reference to WriteProcessMemory API critical SC_STR_WRITEPROCESSMEMORY
    Reference to WriteProcessMemory API
  • Reference to CreateRemoteThread API critical SC_STR_CREATEREMOTETHREAD
    Reference to CreateRemoteThread API
  • Reference to WinExec API high SC_STR_WINEXEC
    Reference to WinExec API
  • Reference to CreateProcess API high SC_STR_CREATEPROCESS
    Reference to CreateProcess API
  • Reference to LoadLibrary API high SC_STR_LOADLIBRARY
    Reference to LoadLibrary API
  • Reference to GetProcAddress API high SC_STR_GETPROCADDRESS
    Reference to GetProcAddress API
  • OLE document has large unaccounted-for region high OLE_SLACK_ANOMALY
    OLE file is 105,474 bytes but its declared streams total only 21,151 bytes — 84,323 bytes (80%) live in unallocated sector slack. This is the canonical hiding place for pre-macro-era Office exploit payloads (XOR-encoded shellcode reached via a parser pointer-corruption bug in the document structure).
  • Reference to VirtualAlloc API medium SC_STR_VIRTUALALLOC
    Reference to VirtualAlloc API
  • Reference to VirtualProtect API medium SC_STR_VIRTUALPROTECT
    Reference to VirtualProtect API

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