RTF / .DOC malware analysis — malicious · bfb9f1766b776109

MALICIOUS

RTF / .DOC

227.8 KB

MD5: 0eea1e8d277f15cbc745d0cc5e881710 SHA-1: dc5a0c897daeeae3bef6dd63740c2b34d50fe376 SHA-256: bfb9f1766b776109a3f29d3800def5793c69bd9653af08192885bb28fbb1d3bc

180 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK

T1204 Malicious Link T1204.002 Malicious Link: Malicious File T1566 Phishing T1566.001 Phishing: Spearphishing Attachment

The RTF document contains multiple OLE objects, including automatically linked and updated objects, which are designed to activate and potentially execute embedded code. The presence of a 'Macro/content-enable lure' heuristic indicates the document likely instructs the user to enable content, a common social engineering tactic to bypass security measures. No scripts were extracted, and no document body was provided, but the OLE object activation strongly suggests a malicious payload delivery attempt.

Heuristics 6

Composite Moniker in RTF OLE object high CVE related RTF_COMPOSITE_MONIKER_RELATED

RTF contains Composite Moniker CLSID in OLE object context, but no nearby scriptlet/SCT payload was confirmed. Treat as related moniker attack-surface evidence rather than proof of CVE-2017-8570 exploitation.
Automatically linked OLE object high RTF_OBJAUTLINK

RTF contains \objautlink — an automatically linked OLE object surface that can be updated or activated when Word opens the document.
\objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE

RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA

RTF contains 3 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
Embedded OLE object medium RTF_OBJEMB

RTF contains \objemb — embedded OLE object
Macro/content-enable lure medium SE_ENABLE_LURE

Document instructs the user to enable macros or editing — a common technique used by malware droppers to bypass Office macro security settings

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

Filename	Kind	Source	Size
`objdata_00_off00000bac.bin` `680cfa066a366fd1c9e40bf435f72076940e86df7584a64a580167fd0daf8c87`	rtf-objdata-decoded	RTF \objdata at offset 0xBAC	19605 bytes
`objdata_01_off0000ab97.bin` `18cff8ef194415d33763880bf64011d23305e4b9143b76244b89e1c53b70a0d5`	rtf-objdata-decoded	RTF \objdata at offset 0xAB97	2632 bytes
`objdata_02_off0000c13a.bin` `44deae4627fee3c44f54d5bd10477ec2e17f4c08135f08e2417832e36d10d037`	rtf-objdata-decoded	RTF \objdata at offset 0xC13A	12297 bytes

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