Malicious Office (OLE) / .XLS — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 bf9ea906e524f416…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE) / .XLS

309.0 KB Created: 2006-09-16 00:00:00 Authoring application: Microsoft Excel First seen: 2023-05-24
MD5: 294c0f48f79a7628f41e4174031fb81d SHA-1: c488b87d000583e61746f181530174baea4ad414 SHA-256: bf9ea906e524f4164c9f62255151cc637fc25fdc2b94bd994630386761fc859d
112 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1204.002 Malicious File: Malicious File T1059.005 Command and Scripting Interpreter: Visual Basic

The critical heuristic firing indicates the sample exploits CVE-2017-0199 using an OLE2Link object to load a remote resource. The embedded URL points to a .doc file, suggesting a document-based exploit. Although no executable VBA code was found, the presence of the OLE2Link exploit mechanism and the embedded URL strongly indicate a remote code execution attempt.

Heuristics 5

  • OLE2Link / URL Moniker → remote loader — CVE-2017-0199 critical CVE likely CVE_2017_0199
    Document contains an embedded OLE link object whose URL Moniker points to a remote URL. When the host file is opened, Office follows the link, downloads the URL, and processes the response based on its Content-Type (HTA -> mshta.exe, RTF → Word, etc.) — the documented CVE-2017-0199 primitive. The URL extension is not a reliable filter; servers can return different payloads to Office's user agent.
  • Secondary embedded PDF body has suspicious static findings high POLYGLOT_CHILD_PDF_STATIC_TRIAGE
    A valid PDF body was found at a nonzero offset inside another container and its carved contents matched PDF exploit or lure heuristics. This catches polyglots where the top-level magic routes to ZIP/OLE while a PDF reader or downstream parser opens the hidden PDF payload.
  • VBA project contains no executable statements low OLE_VBA_MACROS
    Document contains a VBA project, but extracted modules only contain attributes/options/comments and no executable statements.
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://46.183.221.116/in/i/ijijijijiijijijiiji%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23jijijiiijijijijiji.doc

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas
7f506327609c082af1cd37dde23bc2c71a000f7d1ef530b6abb66775040a7673		 vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source) 1206 bytes
polyglot_child_pdf_off00011600.pdf
d3c57414f51a3dac3a01dae84c52d9749262f46316c90e1faeede0ab9b8709b0		 polyglot-child-pdf Secondary PDF body inside ole container at offset 0x11600 245248 bytes
polyglot_child_pdf_off00015e00.pdf
f99dccf96a3f8b2b37c3ceafb825ff3ddc72dc31c4513a5d1a0439afae52e41e		 polyglot-child-pdf Secondary PDF body inside ole container at offset 0x15E00 226816 bytes

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