RTF malware analysis — malicious · bf900ac2da087d08

MALICIOUS

RTF

196.1 KB First seen: 2019-01-11

MD5: b5abca6b2109bac876ecb39b21e449bb SHA-1: 24af33aaa308b066f085ff6863cc5bf250458cb7 SHA-256: bf900ac2da087d081e681d1d92ee8122702e01a1aee3c0a5081fa227b833dea0

120 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK

T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

The RTF file contains an embedded OLE object with a split Equation Editor ProgID, a known exploit vector. The \objupdate directive forces the activation of this object, triggering the exploit. This technique is commonly used to download and execute a secondary payload, hence the high confidence in exploitation for client execution.

Heuristics 3

Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical CVE likely RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR

RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
\objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE

RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA

RTF contains 1 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

Filename	Kind	Source	Size
`objdata_00_off00000f9e.bin`	rtf-objdata-decoded	RTF \objdata at offset 0xF9E	57790 bytes
SHA-256: `daaa2fc68004079f6e0bdc12de10ded96691e77ae4238f23c3bfb0c139699f1b`

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