Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 bf8d0e3dbcd400c1…

MALICIOUS

PDF

85.8 KB Created: 2021-06-28 05:30:32 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 5.11.3)
MD5: 6562ef33c6970d757471781eb4675cbd SHA-1: e1084a459a619b4a904629ce4cebb7057e74703a SHA-256: bf8d0e3dbcd400c1aa49a98635e4c4bace6ace409dfaaf8fea549540703ccf2f
204 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

The sample is a PDF containing embedded JavaScript, which is a common technique for delivering malicious payloads. It also features a link farm pointing to compromised WordPress upload directories, indicating an attempt to host or redirect to malicious content. The ClamAV detection and ML classifier further support its malicious nature, likely as a phishing or trojan delivery mechanism.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9947

Heuristics 8

  • ClamAV: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0
  • LOLBin token sequence in document text high SE_LOLBIN_RUN_COMMAND
    Extracted document text contains a Windows script/execution tool name (PowerShell, mshta, cmd, rundll32, regsvr32, …) within 220 characters of a dangerous flag, command verb, or URL. This is a visible 'run this' instruction in HTML/PDF/RTF lure bodies, or — in macro-laden Office files — the macro's own string-pool entries appearing adjacent in extracted text.
  • PDF link farm points to compromised-WordPress upload storage medium PDF_COMPROMISED_CMS_UPLOAD_LINK_FARM
    PDF contains multiple clickable links, across many distinct hosts, whose targets are random-slug files parked in the upload directories of vulnerable WordPress form plugins (FormCraft, Super Forms). This is the hallmark of the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains hosted on compromised sites. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Embedded JS stream low PDF_JS
    PDF references a /JS stream. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
  • External URI info PDF_URI
    PDF contains an external URL action
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://amagi.la/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/16091f91674091---46613287346.pdf
    • http://www.sbawerribee.com.au/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160b0bb7665979---jobomibebedewowefasegaruk.pdf
    • https://www.medicalart.com.tr/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/1609e513e2af70---befobowurapasawukiferi.pdf
    • https://drmiamiconnect.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/3fe12d62b04ca976a7b2e7da239da659/lokej.pdf
    • http://metrocars.london/survey/userfiles/files/96121932866.pdf
    • https://susta.vn/userfiles/file/87633201375.pdf
    • http://viaterrestre.com.br/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/1606d8d0bbdb42---vofezaxebesaxefoke.pdf
    • https://www.jemelectric.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160bdda13b5e41---98028343712.pdf
    • https://www.psalighting.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/fca96c196b7987ac54a78db4999ae28c/buvek.pdf
    • http://www.maarsehoveniers.nl/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/16083402065839---99007900348.pdf
    • https://www.c2commercial.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/17b51f7caccea58161988fd0f02913c9/lipefo.pdf
    • http://timebank.ru/sites/default/files/photos/pagefile/48424489009.pdf
    • https://tkpmission.org/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/16094c5e8e222f---82641402500.pdf
    • http://akinmedikal.com/uploads/file/90177156436.pdf
    • http://teplospectr.ru/images/files/37483521565.pdf
    • https://www.lenoir-elec.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/4r84ea66l1ar9b9qqn4u0je0jf/54426056874.pdf
    • http://cokhibaosang.com/media/ftp/file/76526313092.pdf
    • https://electrabicycles.pl/app/webroot/uploads/file/16228109504377.pdf
    • http://musclecar-taps.com/js/upload/files/30465782586.pdf
    • https://olmitek.by/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/l93kjhf69p41tguvpsbnjgvg67/seden.pdf
    • https://camgloberealtor.com/userfiles/file/giruzeka.pdf
    • https://canvasations.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/9ecgeie36pumgj3nc0sv3gqj80/41861209668.pdf
    • https://t4g.nasscomfoundation.org/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/0v5d58ragucmdpd0pmjapaue92/5463076266.pdf
    • https://www.explosivo.gr/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/760a4ad942cc810c54ed0a5da969ca28/29323438045.pdf
    • https://feedproxy.google.com/~r/1eyvgo/aqOO/~3/3vuEKuznOb8/uplcv?utm_term=triple+screen+trading+system+pdf
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/
    • http://dejavu.sourceforge.net
    • http://dejavu.sourceforge.net/wiki/index.php/License

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off0000ea5d.bin
9d2294e344127da9ddc2b77d68b1576b6b78373885bc9da2859f180a98f2c1e1
pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xEA5D 16792 bytes
font_01_sfnt_off0001026f.bin
7e609d4da5b52b5d573ce8255d9042961377a566ae5215dc97416f15f2a546fc
pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x1026F 17376 bytes
font_02_sfnt_off00012f7d.bin
76b25eb70de74bdeb2c1252024fed047931e212e3dcf2997d445867b418e93f5
pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x12F7D 10920 bytes