RTF malware analysis — malicious · bf890b70ac21f7f2

MALICIOUS

RTF

95.8 KB First seen: 2024-08-02

MD5: c6c5b4ec107ed0e93ff1b8c9a3a1218e SHA-1: 3abb8737f6c7b2a001b185654fa8f7a809d47804 SHA-256: bf890b70ac21f7f2d79a7a552c6a4d8411f19c6864352c0d22b3bfd9b0d39ed5

120 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK

T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution T1105 Ingress Tool Transfer

The sample is an RTF document that leverages a known vulnerability in the Equation Editor component. The presence of \objdata and \objupdate heuristics strongly suggests that an embedded OLE object is being activated to trigger code execution. This is a common technique for delivering secondary payloads, such as downloaders or droppers.

Heuristics 3

Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR

RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
\objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE

RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA

RTF contains 1 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

Filename	Kind	Source	Size
`objdata_00_off000015ee.bin` `116c584e7e52a99d4757fa8a61d40cf9bebcf3cb7d07872479b1901e1770699e`	rtf-objdata-decoded	RTF \objdata at offset 0x15EE	1899 bytes

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