Malicious Office (OOXML) / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 bf8775ba549752fb…

MALICIOUS

Office (OOXML) / .DOC

78.8 KB Created: 2021-03-26 06:39:00 UTC Authoring application: Microsoft Office Word 16.0000
MD5: f06b91d0397878c6600d7727280d514a SHA-1: cea2e405d94a93e2414553983af3946d386ca2c1 SHA-256: bf8775ba549752fb0c99cbbbe4471b0e857e956d9ae75bafd518dd5164bbf8d2
260 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.005 Visual Basic T1059.003 Windows Command Shell

The OOXML document contains VBA macros, specifically an AutoOpen macro, which is designed to execute code upon opening. The macros utilize WScript.Shell and the Shell() function, indicating an intent to run arbitrary commands. This suggests the document is a malicious macro-enabled file likely used to download and execute a second-stage payload.

Heuristics 7

  • Shell() call in VBA critical OLE_VBA_SHELL
    Shell() call in VBA
  • WScript.Shell usage critical OLE_VBA_WSCRIPT
    WScript.Shell usage
  • AutoOpen macro high OLE_VBA_AUTOOPEN
    AutoOpen macro
  • CreateObject call high OLE_VBA_CREATEOBJ
    CreateObject call
  • Suspicious extracted artifact high EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE
    One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.
  • VBA project inside OOXML medium OOXML_VBA
    Document contains vbaProject.bin — VBA macros present
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingCanvas
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2014/chartex
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2015/9/8/chartex
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/markup-compatibility/2006
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/relationships
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/math
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingDrawing
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/wordprocessingDrawing
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/wordprocessingml/2006/main
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2012/wordml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2015/wordml/symex
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingGroup
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingInk
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2006/wordml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingShape

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas
f49f390f29414a744d831da890aeaa68aef48be44981afd5c54aa8c4340b2322
vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source from OOXML) 7993 bytes
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact contains 1 shell/COM execution token(s). Carved artifact contains 1 eval/decoder/string-building token(s). Carved macro source contains an auto-exec entry point and execution/download terms.
vbaProject_00.bin
5bdbedda1b2ae842c7bfd32682693285466f40602d1a667c337c7cd21ad60c83
vba-project OOXML VBA project: word/vbaProject.bin 36352 bytes
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact contains 1 shell/COM execution token(s). Carved artifact contains 1 eval/decoder/string-building token(s). Carved macro source contains an auto-exec entry point and execution/download terms.