Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 bf5d9eb6af3b4c32…

MALICIOUS

PDF

86.1 KB Created: 2021-06-27 21:08:00 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 5.11.3) First seen: 2021-08-20
MD5: d0c57fda2472247878a64888194a1bec SHA-1: c1393cbf225b9ac129d876f3e5ba0619ee1152c4 SHA-256: bf5d9eb6af3b4c320349b65566bb35b1366685628d388fbe6738c25b01d893bf
256 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1105 Ingress Tool Transfer

This PDF contains an embedded script that references 'Powershell substring last character', and multiple heuristics indicate it is a link farm pointing to compromised websites. The embedded script itself is metadata and does not contain executable code, but the presence of the 'powershell substring last character' string and the link farm strongly suggest the document is designed to trick users into visiting malicious URLs, likely to download a second-stage payload. The ClamAV detection further supports its malicious nature.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9942

Heuristics 9

  • ClamAV: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0
  • Embedded script payload in PDF stream high PDF_EMBEDDED_SCRIPT_PAYLOAD
    PDF stream bytes contain script execution markers such as ActiveXObject/CreateObject, WScript.Shell, PowerShell, or shell-exec primitives. This is stronger than ordinary PDF JavaScript because it indicates a staged external script payload hidden in stream bytes.
  • LOLBin token sequence in document text high SE_LOLBIN_RUN_COMMAND
    Extracted document text contains a Windows script/execution tool name (PowerShell, mshta, cmd, rundll32, regsvr32, …) within 220 characters of a dangerous flag, command verb, or URL. This is a visible 'run this' instruction in HTML/PDF/RTF lure bodies, or — in macro-laden Office files — the macro's own string-pool entries appearing adjacent in extracted text.
  • PDF link farm points to compromised-WordPress upload storage medium PDF_COMPROMISED_CMS_UPLOAD_LINK_FARM
    PDF contains multiple clickable links, across many distinct hosts, whose targets are random-slug files parked in the upload directories of vulnerable WordPress form plugins (FormCraft, Super Forms). This is the hallmark of the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains hosted on compromised sites. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Suspicious extracted artifact medium EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE
    One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.
  • External URI info PDF_URI
    PDF contains an external URL action
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://shtaket46.ru/page_edit/_samples/userfiles/files/balov.pdf In macro / runtime command snippet
    • https://aquariumfargo.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/298d58d7d293e10ec87dcc925f50b6ae/zutulamodelototafefilufe.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://lungtransplantopen.com/clients/d/de/de7cc03d42bda6b8b84c8ac9728529bb/File/28721305477.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.majoriscambio.com.br/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160acf4be2cc2e---wijetisemur.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://recamonde.com.br/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/1607dc754b546e---bunifilelozuxatimog.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://leap-egypt.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/16092b1c2e189a---dojejapojekewama.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.orarestauratorisaf.it/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160c0011d802ec---lutavamokekeko.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://www.hdontheroadnapoli.it/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160ae1cf821050---xeparajilejivu.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://leunamgroup.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/af4928f820d769b62c1f8a421abb2fe9/5380897134.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://gradeagroup.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/npgr1rbqutgjesp8lan2unih92/81322256261.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://www.cir.cloud/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160bb1be98d4d1---bijagoguz.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://bizwd.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160a75602459c9---mubaxufavape.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://www.hagensmarketing.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160959f2b1dc16---62160855688.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://inwama4.vn/webroot/img/files/kafimazaj.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://xn-----6kcabagcgfjsxjciriy6alkh6a7aqk.xn--p1ai/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/1df3fbd36cf837c5506de27dee481aa9/50416886312.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://finsura-lifedirect.com.au/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/1609821dcd2c05---15767751763.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://geoodwierty.pl/files/file/fosuda.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://accessprecision.com/userfiles/file/jixelizuvatalamufulonezel.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://kennedy-jackson.com/clients/f/f7/f78508644b517540cdb1549d93860f53/File/6219815147.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://jamoncup.es/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/1607d23961b9fb---36764384180.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://elm3rad.comfile/94895328083.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.hangmandigital.com/files/file/13524722795.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://distributoram.com/files/file/xozumatadugulezofesa.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://k9-warrior.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/suhbblu74ooetdpjfnm2p608rd/79503517784.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://georgiamusicpartners.org/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/46ec2f6db06c81235b526d06fb5c8950/javoremenabipu.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://feedproxy.google.com/~r/Uplcv/~3/FevRqgeaUVY/uplcv?utm_term=powershell+substring+last+characterPDF link annotation
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
    • http://dejavu.sourceforge.netIn PDF document text
    • http://dejavu.sourceforge.net/wiki/index.php/LicenseIn PDF document text

Extracted artifacts 4

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
embedded_pdf_script_00015326.bin pdf-embedded-script PDF raw stream script payload at offset 0x15326 1591 bytes
SHA-256: 7613aae3eb5d492490dae406111f0678f223fa44d3c658ec75b8d8ba5abab806
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact contains 5 shell/COM execution token(s).
Preview script
First 1,000 lines of the extracted script
<?xpacket begin='' id='W5M0MpCehiHzreSzNTczkc9d'?>
<x:xmpmeta xmlns:x='adobe:ns:meta/' x:xmptk='Pdftk'>
<rdf:RDF xmlns:rdf='http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#'>

 <rdf:Description rdf:about=''
  xmlns:dc='http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/'
  dc:format='application/pdf'>
  <dc:creator>
   <rdf:Seq>
    <rdf:li>Zemivicu Copelo</rdf:li>
   </rdf:Seq>
  </dc:creator>
  <dc:description>
   <rdf:Alt>
    <rdf:li xml:lang='x-default'>Powershell substring last character.   It is important to understand that strings in PowerShell are always objects, whether you are deali</rdf:li>
   </rdf:Alt>
  </dc:description>
  <dc:subject>
   <rdf:Bag>
    <rdf:li>Powershell substring last character.   It is important to understand that strings in PowerShell are always objects, whether you are deali</rdf:li>
   </rdf:Bag>
  </dc:subject>
  <dc:title>
   <rdf:Alt>
    <rdf:li xml:lang='x-default'>Powershell substring last character</rdf:li>
   </rdf:Alt>
  </dc:title>
 </rdf:Description>

 <rdf:Description rdf:about=''
  xmlns:pdf='http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/'
  pdf:Producer='Pdftk'/>

 <rdf:Description rdf:about=''
  xmlns:xmp='http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/'
  xmp:CreateDate='2020-01-08T18:54:35'
  xmp:CreatorTool='Pdftk'/>

 <rdf:Description rdf:about=''
  xmlns:xmpMM='http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/'
  xmpMM:DocumentID='9a2ee1ea-7bb4-4ff5-b583-c4d883d087cd'
  xmpMM:InstanceID='cddf2f31-6b87-4a42-9b6b-b012acac4f08'/>

 <rdf:Description rdf:about=''
  xmlns:xmpRights='http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/'
  xmpRights:Marked='True'/>
</rdf:RDF>
</x:xmpmeta>
<?xpacket end='w'?>
font_00_sfnt_off0000e8d5.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xE8D5 18628 bytes
SHA-256: 218fcc08e52258e3da5e4ae163dc931f4a9d5418d015c59d5bbe9628fecd4b9d
font_01_sfnt_off00011a02.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x11A02 10836 bytes
SHA-256: ecd963c887ad64b3a29c42be7d7272ea8b362f91cc8e70cc1769b29788b1bbe7
font_02_sfnt_off0001331c.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x1331C 16792 bytes
SHA-256: 9d2294e344127da9ddc2b77d68b1576b6b78373885bc9da2859f180a98f2c1e1

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