Malicious Office (OLE) — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 bf4c96169437ab8c…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE)

139.5 KB Created: 1601-01-01 00:00:00 Authoring application: Microsoft Word 6.0 First seen: 2012-06-14
MD5: 9d09c80df99fd268d07e97e2ac61e0f6 SHA-1: 711382c63ee2d22b35c07c9496ed93f095a0860c SHA-256: bf4c96169437ab8c1fd2f3e562c0084ca544e890f445fc6a2a6ae96e123c65e3
280 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.005 Visual Basic

The file exhibits legacy WordBasic macro virus markers and significant OLE structure anomalies, including large slack space and unreadable streams, indicating a deliberately obfuscated or malformed structure. The presence of AutoExec, AutoOpen, and ToolsMacro suggests the potential execution of embedded macros. The embedded artifacts are also flagged by ClamAV as Win.Tool.WM-10.

Heuristics 5

  • ClamAV: Win.Tool.WM-10 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Win.Tool.WM-10
  • Embedded Office document has suspicious static findings critical EMBEDDED_OFFICE_CHILD_STATIC_TRIAGE
    A CFB/OLE Office document was found inside another file type and its carved contents matched Office exploit or payload heuristics. This catches wrapped exploit documents where the top-level file routes to a PE, archive, or generic scanner instead of Office.
  • Legacy WordBasic macro-virus markers high OLE_LEGACY_WORDBASIC_MACRO_VIRUS
    OLE Word document contains legacy WordBasic auto-execution macro markers such as AutoOpen plus ToolsMacro/MacroFile/fileMacro/globMacro or named historical macro-virus strings. These old Word 6/95 macro forms are not exposed as a modern VBA project, so normal VBA source extraction can miss them.
  • OLE document has large unaccounted-for region high OLE_SLACK_ANOMALY
    This finding applies to a carved embedded Office document found at a nonzero offset inside the submitted file, not directly to the top-level document. OLE file is 138,030 bytes but its declared streams total only 0 bytes — 138,030 bytes (100%) live in unallocated sector slack. This is the canonical hiding place for pre-macro-era Office exploit payloads (XOR-encoded shellcode reached via a parser pointer-corruption bug in the document structure).
  • CFB header with no readable streams medium OLE_PARSE_EMPTY_STREAMS
    This finding applies to a carved embedded Office document found at a nonzero offset inside the submitted file, not directly to the top-level document. The file begins with a valid OLE2/CFB header but exposes no directory streams. A non-empty compound document with an unreadable directory is anomalous — it is seen with truncated/corrupt files and, more importantly, with content deliberately shifted off byte boundaries to defeat parsers while the host application still recovers the object.

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
embedded_office_off000012d2.ole embedded-office Embedded OLE/CFB Office body inside ole container at offset 0x12D2 138030 bytes
SHA-256: ac0ec5c3ac3a2215e1484d2296494265e537b6b991bd8c3297d1759ddc130c25
Detection
ClamAV: Win.Tool.WM-10
Obfuscation or payload: unlikely
embedded_office_off00003d7a.ole embedded-office Embedded OLE/CFB Office body inside ole container at offset 0x3D7A 127110 bytes
SHA-256: 6e47cc6a874d20374334c94f20142b79407897abe4d79089087630856d876d93

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