Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 bf40ce86bff4ae7a…

MALICIOUS

PDF

550.7 KB Created: 2008-05-20 15:35:30 -07:00 Authoring application: Adobe InDesign CS2 (4.0.5) (via Adobe PDF Library 7.0)
MD5: dec04b701fb19f366a171974d42b06d6 SHA-1: 3556260d92c3211b16b81b03bd7cc0b6ab543aa4 SHA-256: bf40ce86bff4ae7af1e697c0290ff790579779386a7235bd9b56c26b8a3db5ca
514 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1204.002 Malicious File T1059.003 Windows Command Shell T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

This PDF file exploits CVE-2010-1240 by using a launch action to execute cmd.exe. The command execution is chained with an embedded file payload that is disguised as a PDF but is actually a Windows executable. The embedded executable was detected by ClamAV as Win.Trojan.Rozena-131. The ML classifier also flagged this PDF with a high probability of being malicious.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9941

Heuristics 12

  • Adobe Reader Launch action command execution critical CVE exact CVE_2010_1240
    PDF uses the Adobe Reader/Acrobat Launch action pattern associated with CVE-2010-1240: cmd.exe is invoked with attacker-controlled parameters, paired with an embedded/exported payload.
  • Launch action critical PDF_LAUNCH
    PDF contains a /Launch action whose target is an executable, URL, or UNC path — can start an external application
  • Embedded Windows executable payload in PDF stream critical PDF_EMBEDDED_PE_PAYLOAD
    PDF stream bytes contain an embedded Windows executable with a verified PE header. Exploit chains often hide droppers inside ordinary streams rather than standard /EmbeddedFile attachments.
  • /Launch action target: cmd.exe critical PDF_LAUNCH_COMMAND
    PDF /Launch action specifies an executable target with parameters '/Q /C %HOMEDRIVE%&cd %HOMEPATH%&(if exist "Desktop\\319981.pdf" (cd "Desktop"' — references a known-dangerous executable (cmd, PowerShell, etc.).
  • Embedded attachment masquerades: declared document, content is windows-executable critical PDF_EMBEDDED_FILESPEC_CONTENT_MISMATCH
    An /EmbeddedFile attachment's declared filename extension or /Subtype MIME type contradicts the magic bytes of its decompressed content. The attachment is declared as a benign document or image but the bytes are an executable or executable-bearing archive. This is a deliberate deception used to hide droppers in PDF attachments and is a generic indicator of embed-and-drop weaponisation, independent of any specific CVE.
  • ClamAV: Pdf.Tool.Agent-1388586 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Tool.Agent-1388586
  • ClamAV detection on extracted artifact critical EXTRACTED_FILE_CLAMAV
    ClamAV flagged at least one file extracted from inside this sample. Even when the wrapping document carries no AV detection of its own, a hit on the carved artifact is a strong indicator the sample is a delivery vehicle.
  • /Launch action paired with attachment-dropping JS API high PDF_LAUNCH_PLUS_DROPPER_JS
    PDF combines a /Launch action with a JavaScript API call that writes or opens an attached/external resource — the canonical shape of the CVE-2010-1240 /Launch + exportDataObject family. Benign PDFs do not pair these surfaces; the combination indicates a drop-and-execute chain regardless of the specific JS API knobs or /Launch target.
  • JavaScript action low PDF_JAVASCRIPT
    PDF contains a /JavaScript action. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
  • Embedded JS stream low PDF_JS
    PDF references a /JS stream. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
  • Embedded file low PDF_EMBEDDED
    PDF embeds a file attachment — could carry an executable or another weaponised document as a nested payload
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/tiff/1.0/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/exif/1.0/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/photoshop/1.0/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/g/img/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/sType/ResourceRef#
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/sType/ManifestItem#
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/

Extracted artifacts 5

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
319981.pdf
b8b672fbec11ef88b2e02f76fa61a3994548f82b4bacb22d87e0631f3919b07e		 pdf-embedded-file PDF EmbeddedFile object 76 at offset 0x84822 37888 bytes
Detection
ClamAV: Win.Trojan.Rozena-131
Obfuscation or payload: unlikely
javascript_obj0077_000.js
6e5c8548c96e591f247318fe8ccffb83871ace9dcd187ccb724ffb3787dbe3d3		 pdf-javascript-stream PDF /JS object 77 at offset 0x894E9 55 bytes
font_00_sfnt_off00050e32.bin
62d268d092fd43050a71b43705ecc61f1d72c58fa0a9f9f51253aa9db5821e23		 pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x50E32 10807 bytes
font_01_sfnt_off000523f3.bin
3c291a80bbeb753ee47c9f9cdf3bf02f662d66241374c4f0546048ca9dd29db9		 pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x523F3 10778 bytes
font_02_sfnt_off0007c16b.bin
8e4cb1185b2c1bcce6959b9984345fbc1b6370f367acbfe4f48fc64325c613c7		 pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x7C16B 10080 bytes

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