Malicious RTF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 bf3f0aa1138c272b…

MALICIOUS

RTF

4.1 KB First seen: 2019-06-27
MD5: aca73aed06f5734b7ad084f328e3643f SHA-1: f1ae32a92f89f54e542973a98eb3dcbe05fe9c58 SHA-256: bf3f0aa1138c272b6d76a1db055561b247363adbb9c5e518b17970eb1fe582cf
182 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

The RTF file contains an embedded OLE object that leverages a known vulnerability in the Equation Editor. This vulnerability is exploited to execute arbitrary code, likely a second-stage payload. The presence of shellcode within the extracted OLE object data confirms the exploitation attempt.

Heuristics 5

  • Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical CVE likely RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
  • Suspicious extracted artifact critical EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE
    One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 1 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2003/wordml In RTF body
    • http://bit.ly/2D1jEZjIn RTF body

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off000005e0.bin rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x5E0 1342 bytes
SHA-256: 282b62fc4b69d52564f96df90bfcf45662e7116631b6a796990174dffe467ac3
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Static shellcode analysis recovered URL(s): http://bit.ly/2D1jEZj