Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 bf15872b77a7845d…

MALICIOUS

PDF

350.6 KB Created: 2010-09-20 10:36:57 +08:00 Authoring application: Acrobat PDFMaker 8.1 for Word (via Acrobat Distiller 8.1.0 (Windows))
MD5: 529ae8c6ac75e555402aa05f7960eb0d SHA-1: d793f0c3e051bc03b0cd5e2c2f87f3be33612d49 SHA-256: bf15872b77a7845dd423071a063529c8fdcb6b45665e96f66609ad848b20306d
170 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1553.005 Mark-of-the-Web Bypass T1204.002 Malicious File

This PDF file was detected as malicious by ClamAV with the signature 'Pdf.Dropper.Agent-7217376-0'. Static analysis revealed it contains an embedded secondary PDF, which itself exhibits suspicious findings including being image-only and having dangling indirect objects. The presence of RichMedia (Flash) and an embedded file further suggests a multi-stage attack. The primary function appears to be the delivery of this embedded malicious PDF, likely to bypass initial security checks and execute a further payload.

Heuristics 6

  • Secondary embedded PDF body has suspicious static findings critical POLYGLOT_CHILD_PDF_STATIC_TRIAGE
    A valid PDF body was found at a nonzero offset inside another container and its carved contents matched PDF exploit or lure heuristics. This catches polyglots where the top-level magic routes to ZIP/OLE while a PDF reader or downstream parser opens the hidden PDF payload.
  • ClamAV: Pdf.Dropper.Agent-7217376-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Dropper.Agent-7217376-0
  • RichMedia (Flash) high PDF_RICHMEDIA
    PDF contains /RichMedia (Adobe Flash) which is a historic exploit vector (matched inside decoded stream)
  • Embedded file low PDF_EMBEDDED
    PDF embeds a file attachment — could carry an executable or another weaponised document as a nested payload (matched inside decoded stream)
  • PDF paints image(s) but contains no text operators info PDF_IMAGE_ONLY_LURE
    PDF has 2 image XObject(s) and the content stream contains no text-emitting operators (BT/ET, Tj, TJ, ', ") in either raw bytes or decompressed streams — this is the screenshot-as-PDF pattern used to bypass text-based scanners and to deliver instructions purely through rendered pixels. It is informational unless paired with invisible links or risky URI context.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdfx/1.3/

Extracted artifacts 4

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objstm_0017_00.bin
c515a5551a72a8497045fc7510d95c5a1a4edc56f02c0e8a1e04fb3285830168		 pdf-objstm-decoded PDF /ObjStm 17 0 obj (inflated) 1038 bytes
icc_00_off0003b3d9.icc
2b3aa1645779a9e634744faf9b01e9102b0c9b88fd6deced7934df86b949af7e		 pdf-icc-profile PDF ICC profile at offset 0x3B3D9 3144 bytes
polyglot_child_pdf_off0003ab76.pdf
10e7eb0a8646089b8eeae9566f752d7533acdbc99aee82cb799081ab2e3cb5d8		 polyglot-child-pdf Secondary PDF body inside pdf container at offset 0x3AB76 118494 bytes
polyglot_child_pdf_off00056267.pdf
0b1c923c8a0028794f3a3244dc498786746334f394e41678cc58ffbeb707d0a8		 polyglot-child-pdf Secondary PDF body inside pdf container at offset 0x56267 6125 bytes

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