Malicious RTF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 bf00e99d63093f24…

MALICIOUS

RTF

342.1 KB First seen: 2017-11-20
MD5: a00aa58319dc2fb00382b484e1ca6dca SHA-1: 6aede7dd272a2de93b09ca7df136f26d69b0628a SHA-256: bf00e99d63093f24f16256186869e4ddda162d6388eea3cf0507d1f1feec415c
160 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

The RTF file contains an OLE object that is automatically linked and updated, triggering the exploitation of CVE-2017-0199 or CVE-2017-8759. This vulnerability allows the OLE object to load a remote resource, which is then executed on the victim's machine. The specific second-stage payload is not statically determinable but the mechanism points to a downloader or initial execution vector.

Heuristics 4

  • CVE-2017-0199 / CVE-2017-8759 (OLE2Link auto-activated remote loader) critical CVE related RTF_OLE2LINK_REMOTE_MONIKER_LOADER
    RTF embeds an OLE2Link object that is force-activated with \objupdate (no user interaction on open) and fetches a remote second stage — through an INCLUDETEXT/INCLUDEPICTURE field or the OLE object's own moniker. This is the OLE2Link auto-update attack path shared by CVE-2017-0199 (server returns an HTA/scriptlet) and CVE-2017-8759 (server returns a SOAP WSDL the .NET parser compiles). Office processes the fetched response through the same code path; the specific CVE depends on the now-unreachable server content type.
  • Automatically linked OLE object high RTF_OBJAUTLINK
    RTF contains \objautlink — an automatically linked OLE object surface that can be updated or activated when Word opens the document.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 1 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off0000003f.bin rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x3F 3112 bytes
SHA-256: 95c67c2d0295ecf493eddbae4761f494d61ccbc89f032ddfa7363efc6053021c

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