Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 bee8905aad311b1f…

MALICIOUS

PDF

84.0 KB Created: 2021-09-24 10:46:33 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 5.11.3) First seen: 2021-11-23
MD5: f3d3f24dc86b0eb11f60170bc128fdf2 SHA-1: 7d6e1b78897f2292fec6b90f12a1846a0c9fccf2 SHA-256: bee8905aad311b1fce4186713af0037d5907a9fbee4296ee223c94eac0d80852
184 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

The sample is a PDF containing embedded JavaScript, which is a common technique for exploiting PDF vulnerabilities or delivering malicious content. The PDF also contains numerous external URIs, many of which point to compromised websites or disposable hosting, suggesting a link farm designed to redirect users to malicious sites. The ML classifier and ClamAV detection strongly indicate malicious intent, likely related to phishing or malware distribution.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9914

Heuristics 8

  • ClamAV: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2528dad23a95d95-d2528dad23a95d95-10044376-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2528dad23a95d95-d2528dad23a95d95-10044376-0
  • Malformed active-content stream length medium PDF_MALFORMED_EXPLOIT_STREAM_LENGTH
    A PDF stream that carries active/exploit-looking content has a declared /Length that does not match the recovered stream body. Malformed stream boundaries and length mismatches are common parser-evasion/supporting evidence around Reader exploit streams.
  • PDF link farm points to compromised-WordPress upload storage medium PDF_COMPROMISED_CMS_UPLOAD_LINK_FARM
    PDF contains multiple clickable links, across many distinct hosts, whose targets are random-slug files parked in the upload directories of vulnerable WordPress form plugins (FormCraft, Super Forms). This is the hallmark of the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains hosted on compromised sites. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Embedded JS stream low PDF_JS
    PDF references a /JS stream. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
  • External URI info PDF_URI
    PDF contains an external URL action
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://infrive.ru/uplcv?utm_term=what+does+netsh+winsock+reset+do PDF link annotation
    • https://fnb-concepts.com/images/uploads/files/dakijirobugolosadepuralol.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://tieulongcopro.com/luutru/files/10406376094.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.vlaamspatientenplatform.be/_plugin/ckfinder/userfiles/files/55118010511.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://abogarestudio.com/userfiles/file/93187809766.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://transcendenceit.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/092e52a23b34a5a2304128d0bfee9c2f/5507356640.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://e5tbr.alruaa.com/ckeditor-ckfinder-integration/uploads/files/pinarimedid.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://metall-press.ru/files/81360751620.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.hotel-margherita.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/16140a1bc463e8---3021316916.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://orangcar.com/app/webroot/upload/files/96784444154.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://technoarc.net/userfiles/file/suzopur.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://danieldesignpro.com/userfiles/22409278132.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://vicotelecom.vn/static/source/images/file/komiwan.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://kermanrooz.com/img/files/rusubozazuvatobipok.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://sun-eko.eu/files/file/rukababasorexamamojuj.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://servmed.net/userfiles/file/86893693325.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://harteron.ee/userfiles/file/69163434093.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://plusk-car.com/js/upload/files/98440394213.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://www.colegiumaniucarei.ro/ckfinder/userfiles/files/zetotuvu.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://abyss.sk/userfiles/file/xukatawiwufaguf.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://machulski.com/public/file/jejipidunilotirofovisaja.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://legacydockandmarine.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/2c55f26e5bb633e04f7b4417fe95284f/61513669460.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://togul.org/sites/default/files/file/96511966973.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://lapempi.nl/ckfinder/userfiles/files/72498437934.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://chiesamadremarsala.eu/userfiles/files/lafudugiwivudeji.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.scea.edu.mn/ckfinder/userfiles/files/65187343412.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://gibkrakow.pl/uploads/files/16912143618.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
    • http://dejavu.sourceforge.netIn PDF document text
    • http://dejavu.sourceforge.net/wiki/index.php/LicenseIn PDF document text

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off0000e16a.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xE16A 16792 bytes
SHA-256: 9d2294e344127da9ddc2b77d68b1576b6b78373885bc9da2859f180a98f2c1e1
font_01_sfnt_off0000f97c.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xF97C 18608 bytes
SHA-256: 585b91c207a93c4591f4438be3d729006b3b35f4cd29d6f8d21365457e379985
font_02_sfnt_off00012988.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x12988 10592 bytes
SHA-256: 65dc4f67d5c41129b1fc967279aef2ecbf23c362cef7a1d7fb4e16119784ed9c

Open this report in the interactive analyzer, or submit your own file for analysis.