Malicious Office (OOXML) — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 be734fb2b689fdc1…

MALICIOUS

Office (OOXML)

57.4 KB Created: 2018-07-09 14:47:00 UTC Authoring application: Microsoft Office Word 15.0000 First seen: 2019-08-04
MD5: f57148956371388f7ad4f443961514fc SHA-1: 902428ea03a7c2bde3f8188659ab88e1f3150c11 SHA-256: be734fb2b689fdc19a28f3e3d45b1348a2c5154f92d827316f834a4f643e1f70
82 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

The sample is an OOXML document that contains an external OLE object relationship pointing to a suspicious URL. This is strongly indicative of an attempt to exploit CVE-2017-8759, a known vulnerability that allows for remote code execution. The embedded URL is the primary indicator of compromise, likely serving as a download location for a secondary malicious payload.

Heuristics 3

  • OOXML OLE2Link remote document — CVE-2017-8759 related high CVE related CVE_2017_8759_RELATED
    Document contains an o:OLEObject Type=Link whose external oleObject relationship fetches a remote Office-looking document. That is the OOXML OLE2Link staging shape used by CVE-2017-8759 campaigns when the remote document/WSDL supplies the SOAP moniker payload; the local file alone does not contain the WSDL body needed for an exact match.
  • External OLE object relationship high OOXML_EXTERNAL_OLE_OBJECT
    Document contains an oleObject relationship whose target is an external HTTP(S) URL. Office resolves this through OLE/object update paths rather than as a normal user-clicked hyperlink.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingCanvas In document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/markup-compatibility/2006In document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/relationshipsIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/mathIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingDrawingIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/wordprocessingDrawingIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/wordprocessingml/2006/mainIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordmlIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2012/wordmlIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingGroupIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingInkIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2006/wordmlIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingShapeIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • https://120536897-427876347492950645.preview.editmysite.com/uploads/1/2/0/5/120536897/documents.docIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
emf_00.emf ooxml-emf OOXML EMF part: word/media/image2.emf 195740 bytes
SHA-256: 53ef4632c58d6c1ddb05398667a91d3ac93bf6b27d70859a1b02d0cf32d000a4