Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 be61da70e073d127…

MALICIOUS

PDF

114.2 KB Created: 2009-07-08 10:53:46 +08:00 Authoring application: Acrobat Distiller 7.0 (Windows)
MD5: 8f2f27a18cf095adbbd7b2018cd6c39e SHA-1: 5ec536075473b41091ef7a17a0166186d0404dbc SHA-256: be61da70e073d12795791f66a8fed57af85b9025c314b970b6ca6422f5e5b23f
76 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.001 PowerShell T1204.002 Malicious File

The PDF file contains embedded JavaScript that leverages the CVE-2009-4324 vulnerability. The critical heuristic indicates that the PDF launcher concatenates info fields, extracts characters at a fixed stride, and evaluates the result, which is a common technique for executing arbitrary code. This points to an attack pattern where the PDF is used as a dropper for further malicious activity.

Heuristics 4

  • media.newPlayer — CVE-2009-4324 critical CVE exact CVE_2009_4324
    PDF JavaScript calls media.newPlayer — CVE-2009-4324 is a use-after-free in Adobe Reader's multimedia plugin triggered by media.newPlayer(). Actively exploited as a zero-day in December 2009. (identified after JavaScript deobfuscation)
  • JavaScript action low PDF_JAVASCRIPT
    PDF contains a /JavaScript action. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
  • Embedded JS stream low PDF_JS
    PDF references a /JS stream. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdfx/1.3/

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
javascript_obj0017_000.js
fec02ac84241a606ddee84042d46f183d5a3e8bc4f3fce27d6a568b328437545
pdf-javascript-stream PDF /JS object 17 at offset 0x4DD 2944 bytes
js_property_alias_stage_000.js
0a0704461fa8203c43232880ecb4cca3a34501dc5b509982d7b0a154ee6ce5a0
deobfuscated-js JavaScript hex-escape property alias normalized stage at offset 0x4DD 2821 bytes