Malicious RTF / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 be46e79c4a0944c1…

MALICIOUS

RTF / .DOC

4.2 KB
MD5: 4edaf1c8547136dc5770edad403389a5 SHA-1: a116c1a4d606521212fc458629f2fea81b48576c SHA-256: be46e79c4a0944c1bf08a92cf56c399c35d8d09dfba13e2bc2c4116648e5aebf
120 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution

The RTF document contains embedded OLE objects and specifically triggers Equation Editor, indicating an attempt to exploit a known vulnerability for code execution. The ".objupdate" directive forces the activation of the embedded object, which is a common technique for delivering malicious payloads. No document body or scripts were extracted, but the heuristics strongly suggest exploitation of the Equation Editor vulnerability.

Heuristics 3

  • Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 2 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off0000007d.bin
09bf29d14efc8edc482c2c4dac8842866be7d33e833215fa4c14193a23f70a2e
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x7D 1951 bytes