Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Heuristics 5

• DocuSign download lure links off-domain high PDF_DOCUSIGN_DOWNLOAD_LURE
  PDF contains DocuSign-themed document/download lure text and a clickable HTTP(S) action whose destination is not a DocuSign domain. This is the common credential-phishing carrier shape: a fake signing/download page routes the user to unrelated infrastructure rather than DocuSign.
• Image-only PDF lure links to a brand-impersonating path on an unrelated host high PDF_IMAGE_LURE_BRAND_PATH_LINK
  PDF is image-heavy with little real text and its clickable action targets a URL carrying a brand name ('docusign') as a path segment on a host that does not belong to that brand and is not known-good (e.g. 'sodecoperu.com/Docusign/index.php'). This is the credential-phishing carrier shape where a compromised or unrelated host serves a brand-named phishing kit behind a screenshot-like lure page. Distinct from the typosquat-host rule: here the host is honest-looking but the brand lives in the path.
• Image-only document with action trigger (screenshot lure) medium PDF_IMAGE_LURE
  PDF has 2 image(s), only 0 text block(s), carries a click-outward action, and is only 185 KB — typical shape of a phishing lure where a full-page screenshot hides a clickable button that launches or submits to an attacker URL.
• External URI info PDF_URI
  PDF contains an external URL action
• Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
  One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
  URL https://munishjain.com/sign/reviewdocs/docusignOffice2017/docusign/docusign PDF link annotation

  • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
  • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
  • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
  • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
  • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
  • http://www.microsoft.com/typography/ctfontshttp://lucasfonts.comMicrosoftIn extracted file (font_00_sfnt_off0000b980.bin)
  • http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/MIT_LicenseIn extracted file (font_00_sfnt_off0000b980.bin)
  • http://www.microsoft.com/typography/fonts/default.aspxIn extracted file (font_00_sfnt_off0000b980.bin)
  • http://crl.microsoft.com/pki/crl/products/MicrosoftTimeStampPCA.crl0XIn extracted file (font_00_sfnt_off0000b980.bin)
  • http://www.microsoft.com/pki/certs/MicrosoftTimeStampPCA.crt0In extracted file (font_00_sfnt_off0000b980.bin)
  • http://crl.microsoft.com/pki/crl/products/MicCodSigPCA_08-31-2010.crl0ZIn extracted file (font_00_sfnt_off0000b980.bin)
  • http://www.microsoft.com/pki/certs/MicCodSigPCA_08-31-2010.crt0In extracted file (font_00_sfnt_off0000b980.bin)
  • http://crl.microsoft.com/pki/crl/products/microsoftrootcert.crl0TIn extracted file (font_00_sfnt_off0000b980.bin)
  • http://www.microsoft.com/pki/certs/MicrosoftRootCert.crt0In extracted file (font_00_sfnt_off0000b980.bin)
  • http://www.microsoft.com/Typography/0In extracted file (font_00_sfnt_off0000b980.bin)

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