Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 be1a197a98233fac…

MALICIOUS

PDF

73.4 KB Created: 2020-12-25 05:53:31 +02:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7) First seen: 2021-10-26
MD5: 1c2a7df2f947385dfe7347d4f6911f1e SHA-1: bac117e8eee04202d6249941230a3bff8861b55f SHA-256: be1a197a98233facbea44cf16c0d7da85abb32650e6a4678beedf4b44b598295
252 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1059.007 JavaScript

The PDF contains a large number of embedded URLs, many pointing to disposable hosting or known redirectors, indicating a link farm designed to lead users to potentially malicious content. The ClamAV detection and ML classifier strongly suggest malicious intent, likely related to phishing or malware distribution through these links. No scripts were extracted, but the structure and URL findings are sufficient to assess the attack pattern.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9994

Heuristics 7

  • ClamAV: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0
  • PDF links to known malicious redirector infrastructure critical PDF_MALICIOUS_REDIRECTOR_LINK
    PDF contains a clickable URI to redirector infrastructure used by a known malicious PDF SEO/adware delivery campaign. These documents typically rely on user interaction and redirect chains rather than a PDF parser vulnerability.
  • Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Visual download / call-to-action button lure low SE_DOWNLOAD_BUTTON
    Document contains a call-to-action phrase ('Click here to download', 'Download Now', etc.) — low-signal unless other findings point to a malicious workflow
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://traffmen.ru/aws?utm_term=mpsc+group+c+pre+2019+answer+key In PDF document text
    • https://febumade.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/7/134757335/xegapifowesisoba.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4365638/normal_5fd2d93ccadf1.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.sqhk.co/vugujebeku/hiibthh/bet365_customer_service_number_australia.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://xinufagepowe.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/4/134437511/wulabejugokofador.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://jepalojut.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/8/134863082/lagoliwivodat.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.sqhk.co/jasorevujoxu/BwiccON/juniper_2200_switch_configuration_guide.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://sapilijufidukuw.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/9/134901451/133804.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://nasotatuji.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/3/134392375/naretazebafanameb.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.sqhk.co/dutebosatu/Skgco3Q/61849655220.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/In PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.htmlIn PDF document text
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/gadumagabusodel/fegovutafijopovenenelan.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFLIn PDF document text

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off0000dfc0.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xDFC0 5812 bytes
SHA-256: b5bb99daec29396f93a1fe352b04395b89a32d0a7b458ca6c6ddaf583d2a948d
font_01_sfnt_off0000f3cb.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xF3CB 10576 bytes
SHA-256: 7b6b712a8fd24328310253312ed2d1911f589f9e4ca262c771afa3b2c80a0e9e

Open this report in the interactive analyzer, or submit your own file for analysis.