Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 be15bf79fac3a447…

MALICIOUS

PDF

32.5 KB Created: 2020-11-07 20:48:06 +02:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7)
MD5: 0095e9184e1199912b55bd8134c52fb6 SHA-1: 19d91a14a0818c3b1c4c91c2f7e4498cff150785 SHA-256: be15bf79fac3a4477d64f50213bb064f8a03e7ce7c3914471c94f04d8d3f876d
94 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1059.007 JavaScript

The PDF contains a direct link to a known malicious redirector, cctraff.ru, which is likely used to distribute further malware or conduct phishing. The ML classifier also strongly indicated maliciousness. While no scripts were explicitly extracted, the PDF structure itself facilitates the redirection, aligning with common techniques for initial compromise via malicious documents.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 1.0000

Heuristics 3

  • PDF links to known malicious redirector infrastructure critical PDF_MALICIOUS_REDIRECTOR_LINK
    PDF contains a clickable URI to redirector infrastructure used by a known malicious PDF SEO/adware delivery campaign. These documents typically rely on user interaction and redirect chains rather than a PDF parser vulnerability.
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://cctraff.ru/123?keyword=bread+gloves+tf2
    • https://pinonomobeberex.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/3/134318871/d142f4d940.pdf
    • https://vizipelijokefar.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/5/134512389/5155138.pdf
    • https://kabudededawizo.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/3/131383409/sawizar-tubaxave-zopulenog.pdf
    • https://zadumeredevasax.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/4/131453870/3077207.pdf
    • https://legobunisazej.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/5/134501617/5e8d8b176957.pdf
    • https://felomogolupa.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/3/134345494/6573087.pdf
    • https://zupipozove.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/5/134589893/2707230.pdf
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.html
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/jozetej/77090264008.pdf
    • https://jebefipala.files.wordpress.com/2020/11/6087416240.pdf
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/tabagelufazafew/77164463542.pdf
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/a191d406-3749-4998-a0bb-f2dabb2e4eb5/where_davinci_resolve_save_projects.pdf
    • https://nixeporebumo.files.wordpress.com/2020/11/zezexigegovakopegizowag.pdf
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/a87c2af5-99ca-4cab-a359-12cf34cac1c4/monopoly_cheaters_edition_rules.pdf
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFL

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off00004323.bin
46d49f3d8f5d8f9bc6ab569de3ad03471fafa886c2b3a91560344649d536b1bb		 pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x4323 5316 bytes
font_01_sfnt_off00005554.bin
aa5eb46dc23f5241437959d24350a364e7b531bcafb1b417879678b4b812c2ca		 pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x5554 9540 bytes

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