Malicious RTF / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 be0e63b54d1a501c…

MALICIOUS

RTF / .DOC

3.4 KB
MD5: 910a32605df7ef1119c4696d5597dc7f SHA-1: 831a276868521362dc39cf1d7d0e5b3ef722622c SHA-256: be0e63b54d1a501cc10dede9f453aca7a5d88cae50c7f3d9d57979adf0b310e7
120 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution T1559.002 Component Object Model Hijacking

The RTF document contains embedded OLE object data, specifically targeting the Equation Editor component. The presence of `RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR` and `RTF_OBJUPDATE` heuristics indicates that the document is designed to exploit a known vulnerability in the Equation Editor to achieve code execution when the object is activated. The `RTF_OBJDATA` heuristic further confirms the presence of embedded OLE objects.

Heuristics 3

  • Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 2 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off000000ad.bin
88a0af4666bc611caea4fdda3e64a4eb3bbd34e9d08c421b8a595305cfdf2030
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0xAD 1465 bytes