RTF malware analysis — malicious · bdfe26c46506f0b5

MALICIOUS

RTF

37.9 KB First seen: 2023-07-25

MD5: 16c86dc754159962f724b63508563cd4 SHA-1: d8d33c52dc22381ef960beec4cfd5b0467eaf652 SHA-256: bdfe26c46506f0b521cd53a6b81a075b8354c87007c22549afea86f7a3f8ef33

140 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK

T1204.002 Malicious File T1059.005 Visual Basic

The RTF document contains an embedded OLE object and triggers an ".objupdate" event, indicating an attempt to activate the object. The "RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR" heuristic specifically points to a likely exploit targeting the Equation Editor vulnerability. The document body contains a lure instructing the user to 'Enable editing', which is a common tactic to bypass macro security settings and facilitate exploitation.

Heuristics 4

Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR

RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
\objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE

RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA

RTF contains 1 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
Macro/content-enable lure medium SE_ENABLE_LURE

Document instructs the user to enable macros or editing — a common technique used by malware droppers to bypass Office macro security settings

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

Filename	Kind	Source	Size
`objdata_00_off000042bc.bin` `8ee87f1972de207fa088e4c316029ca98209fe5050f18ba0606d1ef856666c09`	rtf-objdata-decoded	RTF \objdata at offset 0x42BC	1573 bytes

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