RTF / .DOC malware analysis — malicious · bdf09ebcc9c84860

MALICIOUS

RTF / .DOC

536.4 KB

MD5: 1f5f74363e7279a8ea1269b26abefef5 SHA-1: 907b1a11a6612d0109a3ab2f2d8f0164169de590 SHA-256: bdf09ebcc9c84860b045b6e9bb5186f33f69b695911ad05558f3085fc0f189d6

180 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK

T1204.002 Malicious File T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1059.005 Visual Basic

The RTF document contains multiple OLE objects, including automatically linked and updated objects, which are designed to be activated by the user. The 'SE_ENABLE_LURE' heuristic indicates the document explicitly instructs the user to enable macros or editing, a common tactic for malware droppers. While no scripts were extracted, the OLE object activation strongly suggests the document's purpose is to download and execute a secondary payload.

Heuristics 6

Composite Moniker in RTF OLE object high CVE related RTF_COMPOSITE_MONIKER_RELATED

RTF contains Composite Moniker CLSID in OLE object context, but no nearby scriptlet/SCT payload was confirmed. Treat as related moniker attack-surface evidence rather than proof of CVE-2017-8570 exploitation.
Automatically linked OLE object high RTF_OBJAUTLINK

RTF contains \objautlink — an automatically linked OLE object surface that can be updated or activated when Word opens the document.
\objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE

RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA

RTF contains 3 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
Embedded OLE object medium RTF_OBJEMB

RTF contains \objemb — embedded OLE object
Macro/content-enable lure medium SE_ENABLE_LURE

Document instructs the user to enable macros or editing — a common technique used by malware droppers to bypass Office macro security settings

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

Filename	Kind	Source	Size
`objdata_00_off00000bb0.bin` `c1afafd92c3471f5c8d862212660ab1a41da30d7664d17168ddff93de51c3116`	rtf-objdata-decoded	RTF \objdata at offset 0xBB0	171550 bytes
`objdata_01_off00057e29.bin` `9d9bc825f2fa5e0ed8db7dce6823e199ad9c775873472d42887214589f205470`	rtf-objdata-decoded	RTF \objdata at offset 0x57E29	2632 bytes
`objdata_02_off000593cc.bin` `44deae4627fee3c44f54d5bd10477ec2e17f4c08135f08e2417832e36d10d037`	rtf-objdata-decoded	RTF \objdata at offset 0x593CC	12297 bytes

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