Malicious RTF / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 bded0c7da053ff7f…

MALICIOUS

RTF / .DOC

15.7 KB
MD5: 4ab22855e9f0bd4379da4301e17757f5 SHA-1: b1686b5e767c976d86e78e64f876023b429c3aa9 SHA-256: bded0c7da053ff7fde1b831960873ef3555c57d68f80f792e261fc0b9e4142a0
180 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1204.002 Malicious File T1059.003 Windows Command Shell

The RTF document contains embedded OLE objects, specifically triggering the Equation Editor vulnerability (CVE-2017-11882). The presence of `RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR` and `CVE_2017_11882_ACTIVATION_RELATED` heuristics strongly indicates exploitation of this known Microsoft Office vulnerability. The ` tf_objupdate` directive further suggests an attempt to force OLE object activation, leading to arbitrary code execution.

Heuristics 5

  • Equation Editor activation — CVE-2017-11882 related high CVE related CVE_2017_11882_ACTIVATION_RELATED
    RTF decodes to an Equation.3 ProgID and requests OLE activation with \objemb plus \objupdate. This reaches the legacy Equation Editor attack surface used by CVE-2017-11882/CVE-2018-0802 documents, but the malformed MTEF/native payload needed for stronger attribution was not recovered.
  • Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 2 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
  • Embedded OLE object medium RTF_OBJEMB
    RTF contains \objemb — embedded OLE object

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off00000c31.bin
4027b500e8bd1f98f428be612dd907f79fa336606912b177a05565d5f5cf04e8		 rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0xC31 1978 bytes

Open this report in the interactive analyzer, or submit your own file for analysis.