Malicious Office (OOXML) / .DOC — malware analysis report

Heuristics 10

• VBA property-stored shellcode loader critical OLE_VBA_PROPERTY_SHELLCODE_LOADER
  VBA auto-exec macro takes the address (VarPtr) of a byte buffer decoded from a document property, marks memory executable (VirtualProtect/VirtualAlloc), and transfers control through a callback API (e.g. SetTimer/EnumWindows). The payload is hidden in the document properties rather than the macro source — the SVCReady loader pattern, a native shellcode runner rather than a parser CVE.
• VBA instantiates a dangerous COM class by CLSID critical OLE_VBA_GETOBJECT_CLSID_DANGEROUS
  VBA uses GetObject("new:{CLSID}") to instantiate an execution/scripting-capable COM class by its raw CLSID, avoiding the CreateObject ProgID that name-based detection keys on.
• ClamAV: Doc.Downloader.SVCReady-c5c43a913b3eccc9-9953477-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
  ClamAV detected this file as malware: Doc.Downloader.SVCReady-c5c43a913b3eccc9-9953477-0
• OOXML part with non-standard content type and high-entropy data high OOXML_BOGUS_CUSTOM_PART
  The package declares a part with an invented content type (not an OpenXML/Office/standard media type) holding large, high-entropy (likely encrypted/packed) data. Legitimate OOXML files do not carry opaque binary blobs under custom content types; this is the embedded next-stage payload pattern used by loaders such as SVCReady.
• VBA project part renamed to evade filename detection high OOXML_VBA_PROJECT_RENAMED
  The VBA project is bound through the OOXML relationship/content type but its part is not named vbaProject.bin. Legitimate Office producers always emit vbaProject.bin; renaming it hides the macros from path-only scanners (observed in the SVCReady loader).
• Document_Open macro high OLE_VBA_DOCOPEN
  Document_Open macro
• GetObject call high OLE_VBA_GETOBJ
  GetObject call
• VBA project inside OOXML medium OOXML_VBA
  Document contains a VBA project — VBA macros present (project part renamed away from vbaProject.bin: word/nZobbVbfKU.bin)
• Macro/content-enable lure medium SE_ENABLE_LURE
  Document instructs the user to enable macros or editing — a common technique used by malware droppers to bypass Office macro security settings
• Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
  One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
  URL http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingCanvas

  • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2014/chartex
  • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2015/9/8/chartex
  • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2015/10/21/chartex
  • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2016/5/9/chartex
  • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2016/5/10/chartex
  • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2016/5/11/chartex
  • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2016/5/12/chartex
  • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2016/5/13/chartex
  • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2016/5/14/chartex
  • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/markup-compatibility/2006
  • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2016/ink
  • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2017/model3d
  • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/2019/extlst
  • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/relationships
  • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/math
  • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingDrawing
  • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/wordprocessingDrawing
  • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/wordprocessingml/2006/main
  • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordml
  • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2012/wordml
  • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2018/wordml/cex
  • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2016/wordml/cid
  • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2018/wordml
  • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2020/wordml/sdtdatahash
  • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2015/wordml/symex
  • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingGroup
  • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingInk
  • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2006/wordml
  • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingShape

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