RTF malware analysis — malicious · bdc4cdbae345bc16

MALICIOUS

RTF

9.2 KB First seen: 2020-02-04

MD5: fd6bad91c86b295e369c19e54dc4017e SHA-1: 534e485b10cf58595f49008d1108682ac82681c9 SHA-256: bdc4cdbae345bc167c0ab7898524ea48e5ba106c4821d0bc651c8b2dc10ca657

120 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK

T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

The RTF file contains an embedded OLE object with a split Equation Editor ProgID, indicating an attempt to exploit a known vulnerability in the Equation Editor component. The \objupdate directive forces the activation of this OLE object, leading to arbitrary code execution. This is a common technique for delivering malicious payloads via email attachments.

Heuristics 3

Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical CVE likely RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR

RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
\objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE

RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA

RTF contains 1 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

Filename	Kind	Source	Size
`objdata_00_off00000070.bin`	rtf-objdata-decoded	RTF \objdata at offset 0x70	1879 bytes
SHA-256: `6ff85033ae69fb569e6fef5e557a5b4d524be6442721a901081dfcbe4005e199`

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