Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 bd785334ec2e92b5…

MALICIOUS

PDF

12.0 KB
MD5: 06312559787c8e993f719e8fbb3f6097 SHA-1: f42947ae0698ac77fb5d764bccd320a46f7deaab SHA-256: bd785334ec2e92b524b2fd882d4e71aaaa322f9689aa58b30e6e6063e9f0d690
186 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.001 PowerShell T1204.002 Malicious Link

The PDF file contains embedded JavaScript, triggered by the CVE-2007-5659 vulnerability via the 'collab.collectEmailInfo' function. This JavaScript is heavily obfuscated but appears to decode and execute a secondary payload. The presence of multiple JavaScript streams and the specific exploit technique strongly indicate malicious intent, likely for delivering further malware.

Heuristics 7

  • Collab.collectEmailInfo — CVE-2007-5659 critical CVE exact CVE_2007_5659
    PDF JavaScript calls Collab.collectEmailInfo — CVE-2007-5659 is a buffer overflow in Adobe Reader triggered by a long argument or heap-sprayed message field passed to Collab.collectEmailInfo(). Part of a series of Acrobat JS API exploits. (identified after JavaScript deobfuscation)
  • ClamAV: Pdf.Exploit.Agent-36063 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Exploit.Agent-36063
  • Annotation subject callee-key hex JavaScript stager high PDF_ANNOT_SUBJECT_CALLEE_HEX_STAGER
    PDF JavaScript uses syncAnnotScan()/getAnnots() to read an indirect annotation /Subject stream, percent-decodes it through marker replacement, then uses a callee.toString()-derived key to decode and eval the final exploit stage.
  • JavaScript action low PDF_JAVASCRIPT
    PDF contains a /JavaScript action. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
  • Embedded JS stream low PDF_JS
    PDF references a /JS stream. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
  • syncAnnotScan annotation-staging primitive low PDF_FOXIT_SYNCANNOTSCAN
    PDF JavaScript calls syncAnnotScan() — a no-op annotation-enumeration primitive used by exploit-kit JavaScript to stage payload reads from annotation /Subject fields before eval(). Not a vulnerable sink itself; rarely seen in legitimate PDFs. (matched in decompressed stream)
  • Suspicious extracted artifact info EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE
    One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
javascript_obj0007_000.js
eb39e2de4dbbc100de6d3e30aa43ff78fa075618862ba1ebba5151ea3a3b848d
pdf-javascript-stream PDF /JS object 7 at offset 0x19D 273 bytes
annotation_subject_callee_hex_stage_000.js
3be7d6d92df7cc5f28da5d9664abe6263216780b75ad94e8f94504c97da75e1d
deobfuscated-js annotation-subject callee-key decoded JavaScript at offset 0x14A 5061 bytes
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact contains 5 eval/decoder/string-building token(s).
deobfuscated.js
cb87df410fee99e29e2ffd2be3340923d7f6d089653a1891546bfa128612bf1c
deobfuscated-js PDF JavaScript deobfuscation pass 74412 bytes
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact contains 1 long base64-like blob(s).